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PREFACE
This manual details the technical know-how and long experience of the
Lewis Research Center in the handling and u_ilization of hydrogen. It is an
integral component of the Lewis safety program. Howeverj the information con-
tained herein is also believed to have general applicability as an acceptable
standard for meeting minimum safety requirements.
Frank E. Belles
Chairman 3 Advisory Panel
on Experimental Fluids and Gases
George Pablic
Vice-Chairman 3 Advisory Panel
on Experimental Fluids and Gases
James F. Connors
Lewis Executive Safety Board
,\
|, INTRODUCTION
This manual is designed to cover most aspects of hydrogen handling and
usage. Both personnel and equipment are concerned. It is the intent
to present here acceptable hydrogen standards and practices for mini-
mum safety requirements only. More extensive safety precautions should
be employed when there is extra hazard, as in highly-congested areas or
in operations with equipment that has little safety margin.
b. Approach to Hydroqen Safety
(i) Hydrogen operations must be carried out in such a way that the life
and health of personnel are not jeopardized and that the risk of dam-
age to property is minimized. The following principles shall be
adopted:
(a) !nherent Safer Y - Hydrogen systems and operations shall have
a high degree of built-in safety. This will be attained by
proper design, construction, and procedure, observing all
three of the basic axioms for hydrogen safety:
vent:ilation, leak prevention, and elimination of iqnition
sources.
(b)
(c)
Two Lines of Defense - In addition to the inherent safety
features, .at. least two barriers ' or safequaFds shall be pro-
vlde_ to prevent a given failure from mushrooming into a
disaster. For instance: one safeguard against spillage
might be a leak detector which automatically shuts off the
flow; a second might be a shield to protect other equipment
and a safe shelter for personnel.
prope r Controls - Safety functions such as leak detection and
ventilation shall be automaticaIIy controlled. Operatinq
functions such as flow rate and pressure may be controlled
either automatically or manually, as appropriate to the
system. However, even simple tests will require automatic
control if prolonged or repetitive, because of the tendency
for personnel to become inattentive and careless, in any
case, manual controls must be constrained by automatic
Sect. lb
2_
Cd)
llmltinq devices . to prevent over-ranging.
Fail-safe Oesiqn - Whenever possible, failure (including
momentary failure) of equipment, power, or other service
shall cause the system to revert to the condition which
will be safest for personnel and property.
(e) Alertness - Employees must be ever alert to all aspects of
safe_y. They must constantly re-examlne procedures and
equipment to be sure safety has not been compromised or im-
: paired by changes in program or test methods, over-familiarity
with the work, deterioration, or stresses due to abnormal
conditions, etc.
NATURE OF THE HAZARD
a. Properties and Hazards of Gaseous Hydroqen
Specific gravity68°F (air = i.O0) "
Density Ib./ft_ (60°F and 30" of Hg)
Density Ib./ft J (-422.9°F + 30" Hg)
Specific volume ft.3/Ib. (60°F and 30" of Hg)
Critical temperature
Gross heat of combustion BTU/ft. ]
Gross heat of combustion BTU/lb.
BTIJ/ft.3 of stoichiometric gas/air mixture (F/A ratio,
0.418 vol., 0.029 wt.; or 29.5 H2 by vol.)
Ft3 of air required per ft3 of combustible
0.06953
0. O0532...
0.084
187.9
-399.8oF
325. I
61.084
81.3
2.382
Lb. air required per lb. combustible 34.226
Maximum flame temperature (F/A ratio 0.462 vol., 0.0313 wt.;
or 31.6% H2 by vol.) 3865oF
Autoignition temperature in air
Autoignition temperature in oxygen
Flammability limits, % vol. H2 in air
Flammability limits, % vol. H2 in oxygen
Detonation limits, % vol. H 2 in air
Detonation limits, % vol. H2 in oxygen
Nonflammable limits, air-hydrogen-carbon dioxide,
Nonflammable limits, air-hydrogen-nitrogen,
1065°F
1040 °
4.0 - 75.
4.5 - 94.
18.3 - 59.
15.0 - 90.
less than 8%02
less than _ 02
°
,,9
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Minimum spare ignition energy in air (atmospheric pressure)O.O00019 joule
Minimum spark ignition energy in oxygen (atmospheric
pressure) 0.000007 joule
(1)
(2)
Hydrogen gas is colorless and odorless, thus it is not detected
by the senses.
Although not toxic, hydrogen gas can cause suffocation by diluting
air to exclude oxygen.
(3) At normal temperatures, hydrogen gas is lighter than air so that
it tends to rise. But, if the temperature of hydrogen gas is
less than -418OF, as just after evaporation from the liquid, it
is heavier than air at normal temperatures and tends to fa11;
however, wind or forced ventilation will affect the direction of
motion of released hydrogen regardless of its rising or falling
tendency.
(5)
(6)
When mixed with air or oxygen, hydrogen gas forms a highly flam-
mable mixture over a wld_._...eerang of mixture ratios. (See foregoing)
Ignition of explosive mixtures occurs wlth very low enerqy input,
one-tenth that of a gaso]ine-air mixture. An invisible spark can
cause an explosion.
Temperatures of about l,O00°F are usually required for the ignition
of hydrogen and air or oxygen mixtures. (See foregoing) However,
at ]ess than atmospheric pressure, i.e., at 2/10 to 5/10 atmosphere
ignition wi]] occur if temperatures as low as about 650°F are
maintained long enough.
(7) Hydrogen flames are colorless. Any visibility is caused by impur-
ities.
(8) Severe burns have been suffered by persons exposed to hydrogen
flames resulting from the ignition of hydrogen gas escaping from
small leaks in laboratory apparatus.
b. Properties and Hazards of Liquid Hydroqen
Melting point at atmospheric pressure
Bol]ing point at atmospheric pressure
Critical temperature
Critical pressure
Specific gravity (liquid, water = i.00)
-434.6°F
-422.9°F
-399.8°F
]2.8 atmos.
0.07 (4.37 Ibs./cu. ft.)
Sect. 2b
Specific heat BTUIIb./°F
Heat of fusion BTUIIb.
Viscosity (at normal b.p.)
Heat of vaporization (nearly all pare)
Vapor pressure (psig):
0.57
25.2
132 x 10 -6 poises
190.5 BTU/lb.
-433OF -12.8
-423OF 0
-420°F 9.0
-402°F 147.3
(1) All of the hazards which exist when gaseous hydrogen is present
are equally serious with liquid hydrogen because of the ease with
which the liquid evaporates.
(2) People have died from exposure to rather small local flash fires
resulting from the ignition of gas produced by the evaporation of
small amounts of liquid hydrogen.
(3) The continuous evaporation of liquid hydrogen in a dewar causes the
constant generation of gaseous hydrogen which must be either vented
to a safe location or temporarily confined safely.
(4) Vents from storage dewars containing liquid hydrogen may be closed
by accumulations of ice frozen from moisture in the air. Excess-
ive pressure may then rupture the container and release a quantity
of hydrogen.
(s) Liquid hydrogen is subject to contamination with aircondensed and
solidified from the atmosphere or by accumulation of traces intro-
duced in manufacturing. This mixture is unstable and may detonate
with effects similar to those produced by TNT and other high ex-
plosives.
(6) Liquid hydrogen splashed on the skin or in the eyes can cause
serious "burns" by freezing,
c. Exp1os.ion and Detonation.of Hydro qen-Air Mixtures
Hydrogen gas, like other fuels, can burn in two modes. The ordinary
mode of burning is called deflagration, in which the flame travels
through the mixture at subsonic speed. This happens, for instance,
when an unconfined cloud of hydrogen-air mixture is ignited by a
small ignition source. Under these circumstances, the flame will
travel anywhere from ten to several hundred feet per second. The
rapid expansion of hot gases produces a pressure wave. Witnesses will
hear a noise, often a very loud noise, and may say that an explosion
4
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do
occurred. The pressure wave from rapid unconfined burning is not ex-
tremely severe, although it may well be strong enough to damage nearby
structures.
(i)The other mode of burning is called detonation, in which a flame
and shock wave travel together through the mixture at supersonic
speed.
(z) A detonation will often build up from an ordinary deflagration
that has been ignited in a confined or partly-confined mixture.
This is true even though ignition may have been caused by a min-
imal energy source.
(3) On the other hand, it takes a powerfu! ignition source to produce
detonation in an unconflned hydrogen-air mixture. Something like
a blasting cap, a few grams of high explosive, or an exploding
wire, is required.
(4) The pressure ratio across a detonation wave in hydrogen-air
mixture, as seen when the wave passes a detector mounted flush
in a confining wall, is about 20. (A pressure ratio of 20 means
300 psl if the mixture is at atmospheric pressure.) When the wave
strikes an obstacle, the pressure ratio seen by the obstacle is
multiplied 2 to 3 times, or 40 to 60. Even larger pressure ratios
occur locally in the region where a deflagration transforms to a
detonation.
DiFfusion.and Leakaqe. o_ Hydroqen
(I) Diffusion
(a) Hydrogen diffuses approximately 3.8 times faster than air.
A spill on the ground of 500 gallons of liquid hydrogen
will have diffused to a non-exploslve mixture after about
one minute.
(b) Air turbulence increases the rate of hydrogen diffusion.
(2) Leakaqe
Hydrogen in both the liquid and gaseous states is particularly
subject to leakage because of its low viscosity and low molecular
weight. Leakage is inversely proportional to viscosity. Because
of its low viscosity alone, the leakage of liquid hydrogen will
be roughly |00 times that with JP-4 fuel, 50 times that with
5
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water and 10 times that with liquid nitrogen. Likewise, the
leakage of gaseous hydrogen will be approximately twice that
for air.
3. DESIGN PRINCIPLES
a. Safety Approval of De siqn
(2)
Before hydrogen facilities, equipment or systems are constructed,
fabricated or installed, approval for safety of design shall be
obtained from the appropriate safety authority.
To assure a proper safety review, information in writing or
sketch form must be presented for a safety of design review and
approval in these stages:
(a) preliminary or lay-out; hazard and failure-mode analyses
(b) final drawings; design details, structure and containment
(c) draft of operational procedures; instrumentation, detection
b. Detection of Combustible
Means shall be provided for detecting the presence of free hydrogen
in all areas in which there is a possibility of a hazardous accumu-
lation. Because hydrogen is both odorless and transparent, detec-
tion by odor or vision is not feasible. The cloud of frozen air and
moisture which accompanies leaks from liquid hydrogen is visible.
Oetection of leaks by observation of such clouds may not be reliable,
however, because clouds of water vapor also rlse from cold exposed
surfaces when no hydrogen leak is present. Detection of leaks by
observation alone is not adequate.
(l) Response of Detection Equipment
(a) in order to be effective, detection equipment must respond
with sufficient rapidity to avoid a hazardous accumulation.
Large leaks in small rooms require fast detection and shut-
off means. Detector pickups must be located so as to mini-
mize sampling times.
(b) The number and distribution of detection points and time
required to effect shut-off should be based on factors such
as: possible leakage rates, ventilation, and volume of room.
|f time permits, the detection signal may actuate warning
alarms, otherwise it should automatically effect shut-off.
6
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(:2) Gas Detectors
The response and the sensitivity of the detector may be in-
fluenced by the presence of moisture or by mixtures of gases
such as nitrogen, helium, and carbon dioxide. The result
would be a false reading of the atmosphere being probed. In
additio,_, unless the device is equipped with the proper flash
back arrestor, it may become the trigger for an explosion.
Therefore, only units validated for hydrogen-air atmospheres
shall be used.
Manually carried portable gas detectors shall not be used
as the gas detection means for test installations which
require that personnel be located remotely during test
periods.
¢. Oeslqn of Buildings and Chambers
(t) Test Buildin s
(a) 'Hydrogen operations are safest when conducted out-of-doors
where leaks of hydrogen are diffused and diluted to non-
combustible proportions most easily.
(b) However, if protection from the weather is required, the
order of preference of buildings is as follows:
O
_. roof without peaks and no sides
_. well-ventilated roof and removable sides
_, well-ventilated "expendable" building
_. well-ventilated permanent building
(c) When hydrogen operations must be carried on in permanent
buildings, reliable and plentiful ventilation or inerting
atmosphere must be provided. Ignition sources must be elim-
inated or rendered harmless. Suspended ceilings and inverted
pockets are to be avoided or adequately ventilated.
{d) Non-combustible materials lhall be used for building.or equip-
ment construction. The only combustible material allowed in
the hazard area shall be that required for test purposes.
(e) Window panes shall be made of plastic, not glass, and hinged
to swing outward in case of an explosion.
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(f) Hydrogen test-supply dewars and trailers shall be kept out-
of-doors and located so that any leaks will not get into
any building.
(g)
(h)
Dikes. trenches or ground slope shall be used to confine or
divert spillage from buildings, sewers, etc.
Amounts of hydrogen in test rigs inside of buildings shall be
kept at a minimunl and the permissible amount shall be approved
by the appropriate safety authority.
Control Rooms
(a) A pill-box type of control room, located r_notely from the
hydrogen test site, is advisable.
(b)
(c)
No hydrogen piping shall enter the control room. Any control
valve shall have a double diaphragm between the hydrogen line
and the control room. Conduits shall be sealed at the test rig
end. The seal shall be tested to prove its effectiveness.
If wall openings, etc. cannot be sealed, any hydrogen-contain-
ing cell with openings to other rooms shall be maintained
at a negative pressure relative to communicating rooms.
(d) Any window opening into a test cell where excessive ;
pressures or ricocheting fragments could be present must be
considered a hazard. If a window is required, it should be
made as small as practical and should be of bullet-proof glass
or the equivalent. A mirror system or a movable steel panel
can be used to advantage in some cases.
(3) Ventilation
(a) Test Buildinqs
Any test cell or chamber containing hydrogen system com-
ponents shall be adequately ventilated at all times while
hydrogen is in the system. Air quantities or other in-
erting means shall be sufficient to avoid an explosion
and shall be based upon the potential volume of the
leakage gases relative to the room volume, the time avail-
able for instituting corrective measures, and the flammability
limit. Ventilation shall be established prior to entry of
hydrogen into the system involved and continued until the system
8
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(b)
has been purged. Ventilation shall not be shut off as
a function of a n ernerqency shutdown procedure.
2- Warm hydrogen gas rises rapidly and is trapped by inverted
pockets. Avoid covers or any form of pocket which may
trap hydrogen gas.
Control Rooms
Particular attention shall be paid to the ventilation or
source of air for control roofns that may, in case of emer-
gency, be enveloped in combustible or the products of com-
bustion,
(4) !ne,rt Atmosphere by Exclusion of Oxidant
(a) Use of Inert Gas
Test chambers, etc. which cannot be ventilated sufficiently
to cope wlth potential hazards may be rendered non-hazardous
by providing an inert atmosphere of N2, C02, He, or
other inert gas. In such cases, it is desirable to have the
"chamber pressure higher than atmospheric to avoid inward
leakage of air.
(b) _se of Partial Vacuum
Oxidant may be restricted in a test chamber by partial
vacuum. The vacuum should be sufficient to limit the
pressure of an explosion to a value that the tank can
withstand. In this case, the chamber shall be capable
of withstanding 20 times the maximum operating pressure,
except for heads, baffles and other obstructions in a pipe
run, which must withstand 60 times the maximum operating
pressure. Because the reaction time during a detonation
is of such short duration, ultimate stress values may be
used.
d. Desiqn for Vessels
(I) Storaqe Vessels for Hydroqen (General)
i
Ca) Liquid Hydroqen
Liquid hydrogen is stored out-of-doors in dewars (mu]tipIe
watted insulated containers) that are designed to minimize
9
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the evaporation losses. Heat flux into the stored product
via conduction, convection, and radiation is kept at a min-
imum with proper construction and maintenance practices.
Materials for construction of the surfaces exposed to the
cryogen must retain the necessary mechanical properties and
not tend towards low temperature embrittlement. Face centered
cubic metals and alloys'such as aluminum, copper, nickel and
austenitic stainless steels are generally used. The outer
wall or vacuum jacket may be fabricated from mild steels
since it is not subjected to the cryogenic temperature.
Section VIII of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code is
generally followed for the vessel structural design. The
types of insulation employed are:
_. high vacuum (l to 50 microns measured with the dewar at
ambient temperature)
_. high vacuum plus powders such as perlite, silica aerogel,
diatomaceous earth, fused alumina, phenolic spheres, etc.
_. multiple layers of highly reflecting radiation shields
separated by spacers or Insulators plus a high vacuum.
o Insulation is maintained at the supports by using mater-
ials with a low thermal conductivity, (Hastelloy, titanium).
Long reach techniques are used to connect plumbing _o the
product tank so as to increase the resistance of the
heat path. •
Note: Liquid nitrogen radiation shielded dewars are rapidly
being superseded with one of the dry insulation types.
Portable laboratory dewars shall be of the dual entry
or the modified entry type to avoid plugging hazards.
(See Appendix 6)
(b) Ga,,,seou,s,Hyd roqen
Large volumes of gaseous hydrogen are stored out-of-doors in
mobile or fixed cylinders. Mobile tube trailers of°approxl -
mately 70,000 SCF capacity, filled to about 2400 psig, have
been state-of-the-art for many years and have not exhibited
any undue operating problems. Vessels for very large volumes
and/or higher gas pressures have not always been trouble-free.
Part of the problem is in fabricating very large vessels, and
lO
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part of it is due to hydrogen embrittlement at high pressures.
o Based on experience gained from use, a number of mater-
lals are acceptable for hydrogen use at elevated pressures,
namely, A 302-B, A 212-B, A-372 grade 4 for side walls,
and ASTM A225 grade B heads. Austenitlc sta.inless steel
and other more exotic materials are acceptable but costly
and may be considered for liners. (Martensitic stainless
steels such as 403 should not be used for gaseous hydrogen.)
No unrelieved side-wall penetrations should be made. If
pressure gage or liquid drain holes are needed, consider
entry through the forged heads, using dip-tube where
appropriate.
For large diameter vessels, include a manway for regular
visual inspection.
o
_. Avoid use of T-I steel until more uniform and better
controlled fabrication procedures can be established.
(2) Desiqn Criteria for Dewars and Cylinder Trailers
(a) Shut-Off Valves
_. gewars (mobile size) for filling test rigs may be equipped
with manua}iy-operated shut-off valves providing:
_. the valve is attended by the "buddy-system"
during filling, and
_o the dewar pressure does not exceed 20 psig during
filling operations.
Oewars actively used as part of a test rig shall have
remote-operated "fail-safe" shut-off valves adjacent to
the dewar, upstream of any coupling or flexible piping.
A manual over-ride shall be provided for use in case of
power failure.
(b) E|ectrical Equipment
Electrical equipment shall conform to the National Electric
Code requirements for Class l, Group B, Division 2 as a
minimum.
|I
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{c) Electrical Groundinq
Electrical grounding and lightning protection shall be
provided. Grounding shall be by at least #8 AWG cable
with readily attachable and detachable connectors. The
integrity of the grounding system shall be verified routinely.
(d) Connections
(el
(f)
All mobile dewars and tube trailers must have anchored flex-
ible connections to any rigidly mounted test ceil equipment
to allow for flat tires, or rear trailer jacks or axle shor-
ing must be used to prevent sagging motion.
Vent_.___.ss
All dewars shail be equipped with a vertical unobstructed
vent designed to prevent entry and accumulation of atmospheric
precipitation. Dewar vent •system shall be connected to a
building hydrogen vent system when the dewar is parked near
a building; the system shall be designed to carry vented
hydrogen to a safe release location above the roof of the
building.
_. Liquid plumbing and components that are wetted by the
cryogen shall be vacuum jacketed. The plumbing jacketing
shall be separated from that of the main void or product
vessel jacket.
_. Valves and other components that are subject to cold gas
flows or low temperatures shall be suitable for this
cryogenic service.
(g) Bottom 0peninqs
_. Bottom openings on liquid hydrogen containers shall be
avoided wherever possible.
Low points (traps) on liquid discharge piping are to be
avoided to prevent accumulation of contaminants. If they
are unavoidable, provide low point drains.
12
°Sect. 3d
(h) Gas Tube Trailers
Gas tube trailers used for different gases shall have different
connecting fittings so as to prevent cross connection of
different gases. Gas tube trailers shall be equipped with
normall.y, closed safety shut-off valves which require sustained
control power to remain open and will automatically return
to full "closed" upon removal of power. This is an addi-
tion to the manually operated cylinder and main stop valves.
Relief devices are to conform to _CC regulations for this
service,
(i) Valve Cabinets
Valve cabinets shall be well ventilated.
(j) Visibii ity
The research dewar and test rig shall be visible from the
control room or a safety observer. Closed circuit TV is
satisfactory.
(3) Protection of Oewars
(a) Barricades
All dewars shal] be protected from shrapnel. Barricades shall
be installed near the test rig to protect the dewar if.blast
fragments or disintegration of high speed machinery could
cause hazard, in the case of a high rotational speed test
rig, the housing may be designed as the shrapnel shield
between the rig and the dewar.
(b) Pressure Relief Devices
A|I pressure vessels are to be,e(_wipped wlth burst diaphragms
set for a pressure which is not more than 25 percent above
the maximum working pressure of the vessel. The burst disc
housing should be located so that its temperature does not
vary appreciably, and its material and design should be
selected according tO temperature. A relief valve, set to
not more than 10% abov6 the maximum working pressure of the
13
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vessel, shall be installed in parallel with the rupture disc.
The outlet of the burst diaphragm and relief valve should be
ducted away from the work area in the same manner as the tank
vent lines ....
(c) Redundant Burst Discs
The mobile dewars shall be equipped with two burst disc
safety assemblies connected to the product vessel through
a 3-way selector valve to permit isolation of a ruptured
element for safe replacement. The valve shall not have a
center-off position.
(4) Transfer Connections
(a) Gaseous Hydroqen Transfer Connections
_o Gaseous hydrogen trailer connections to rigidly mounted test cell
piping shall conform to established standards of the ASME and API.
Hoses shall be restrained by a Chinese-finger assembly (cable
grip) to prevent lashing in the event of rupture.
_. To prevent infiltration of air, the cylinder pressure should
not be allowed to fall below 25 psig.
(b) L,iquid Hyd,roq,en,Tr, ansfec Conn,ecti, on,s
Ze Dewar connections to rigidly mounted test ceil piping
shall use a supported and anchored flexible metal hose
insulated by vacuum or other method for |ow temperature
service at the desired pressure.
Bayonet-type couplings shall be used. The fasteners may
be of the bolted flange, spanner nut or V band coupling
types designed for the required operating pressure.
See Appendix I for suitable V-band types.
o
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Gasket materials suitable for this cryogenic service
sha|l be employed. (Reference: Ballistic Systems Divi-
sion memo dated 12-17-62; see Appendix 2) Loose fibre
gasket material that can readily be fretted shall not
be used since the loose particles may contaminate the
system. Properly sized gaskets shall be used. ,,_, ring
and '_0" ring grooves shall be matched properly for the
design service conditions.
eo Material and Hardware
(|) Summary of Typical Metals
in general, permissible materials of construction for liquid
hydrogen systems include aluminum, copper, monel, inconel,
austenitic stainless steels (types 304, JO4L, 308, 316, and
321) and brass and bronze. Stainless steel of type _4 7 is
very sensitive to crackin q durinq weldigq and should not be
used unless, proper weldinq precautions are taken. The actual
selection of materials depends on requirements of the specific
application such as thermal conductivity, strength, porosity,
weight, and cost.
(2) 0issimi!ar Metals
Contact of dissimilar metals in liquid hydrogen systems or
containers is to be avoided, as this may encourage corrosion.
Also, differences in thermal contractions and expansions must
be considered.
(3) Pipinq Systems
(a) Threade d joints are acceptable for use on gaseous hydrogen
systems with suitable thread seal. Threaded joints inside
a building are to be back welded to prevent leaks. Threaded
joints are to be avoided on liquid hydrogen systems.
15
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(b) Cryoqenic liquid pipinq should be vacuum iacketed for low
heat leakage. Provision for expansion or contra_tion shall
be provided. Adequate supports shall be provided.
(c) Hiqh pressure qas manifolds are to be constructed of 300 series
(with 347, specia_precautions required) stainless
tubing and are to be welded construction wherever possible.
Provisions for expansion or contraction shall be provided;
adequate supports shall be provided.
o
(d) In vent pip inq a check valve shall be located near the atmos-
pheric discharge to prevent back-flow of air. If over one-
inch in diameter, the vent piping shall be purged (with
nitrogen preferably) immediately before, and immediately
after flowing hydrogen. Purging during hydrogen flow or
of a vent pipe of one-inch diameter or less is not required.
(e) A burst diaphraqm or a relief valve should be installed in
every section of a line where liquid can be trapped. This
condltion exists most often between two valves in series.
k burst diaphragm or relief valve may not be requlred if at
least one of the valves will, by its design, relieve safely
at a pressure less than the design pressure of the liquid
llne. This procedure is most appropriate in situations
where bursting of the diaphragm could create a serious
hazard.
(f) In critical areas where pipes, vessels, or instruments con-
raining hydrogen are subject to failure, the container shal.___l
be shrouded and the shroud vented.
(g) |mportant equipment should not be placed over hydroqen
containers or systems where a hydrogen leak-fire
would cause damage.
16
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Tube Flttinqs
(a), F__orSteel and Stainless Steel Tubinq
Steel and Stainless
Steel Fit,tlnqs ,,_
Max imum P res su re
Size ...... Limi_
Flareless 114 inch Tube strength with proper
safety factor
Flared * I inch Tube strength with proper
safety factor
Flared _ l I/2 inch s-st125 pslg
Ose flanged or welded joints for steel tube sizes
greater than I inch and pressures greater than
125 psig.
_nk It may be desired to use flared fittings in some
cases involving pressures higher than 125 psig and
tube sizes larger than I inch. if so, these cases
are to be considered special and shall be submitted
to the appropriate safety authority for decision.
* Use of flared fittings requires hiqh_gua.llt Y t.oo.ls
and _rkmanship. For tube sizes larger than 3/4'inch
power machines are necessary to obtain the required
quality of flare.
A]_Jninum
Fittinqs
Max imum P res su re
Size Limit:-
Flareless Not Not app roved
app roved
Flared ]/8 inch Tube strength with proper
safety factor
17
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(b) For Copper-Base Tubin q and Aluminum Tubin_
Copper-Base Fittings
and Aluminum Fittinqs
Maximum Pressure
Size Limit , ,
Fiareless Not Not approved
app roved
Flared Industrial
practice
Tube strength with proper
safety factor
(c) Only stainless steel should be used where there are limita-
tions on fittings as a result of fire hazards for hydrogen,
oxygen, and hydraulic systems. Aluminum or copper would
melt and release the hydrogen, etc. to increase the extent
of the damage. Of course, for specific applications such as
heat exchangers in the research apparatus other materials
may be required.
(d) Tightening of fittings shall be in accordance with the manu-
facturer's recommended limits.
(5) Teflon and Simi,,lar Compounds
(a) Kei-F (polytrifluorochloroethylene) or teflon (polytetra-
fluoroethylene) can be used in liquid hydrogen systems for:
_. Valve seats: May be modified teflon (Fluorogreen is
preferred)
Soft coating on metallic O-rings to provide more
positive seal.
Flat-thin gaskets for tongue-and-groove type flanges
where gasket is shrouded on four sides.
_. Spacers in vacuum area between liquid flow tube and
vacuum pipe.
2. Gland packing or seal only if it is maintained near
ambient temperatures as in an extended bonnet of a
shutoff valve. The contraction or shrinkage of teflon
when cooled from ambient to cryogenic temperatures allows
leakage.
18
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(b) For qaseous.hydroqen at ambient temperature, the valve seat
materials can be the conventional composition type.
(6) Metal O-RincLs
(a) Metal O4rings have proven satisfactory for sealing flanges
on liquid hydrogen piping and vessels only when coated with
a soft material and when used on smooth surfaces.
(b) Type 32l stainless steel O-rings, with a coating such as
teflon or silver, should be used in stainless flanges with
stainless bolting.
(c) Likewise, teflon coated aluminum O-rings should be used in
aluminum flanges with aluminum bolting. Using similar
materials avoids the leakage possibility from unequal con-
traction of dissimilar metals.
(d) Surface finishes in the O-ring groove and contact area should
be at least 32 microinches r.m.s. All machine or grind marks
must: be concentric.
(7) Allowable Stresses
For |iquid or gaseous systems, the stress for vesse]s or tubing
shall be no greater than 50 percent of the minimum yield of the
material at 70OF.
(8) Thermal Contra(:t ion
Thermal contraction of a liquid hydrogen system of stainless
steel is usually calculated from ambient to minus 420OF as 0.35'_
of the original length. Long runs of piping require a support
at intervals to allow for the axial motion, with lateral and/or
vertical motion restrained.
Fabrlcation Methods for Fused Joints
(l) General
o
The fused joint, because of its simplicity and high reliabiI{ty,
finds many applications in both gaseous and liquid hydrogen sys-
tems. Soft soldering, hard soldering, and welding can often meet
the bonding requirements; however, for safety reasons the welded
joint takes first preference and in numerous cases is mandatory.
in addition to the high structural efficiency and fatigue resist-
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ance of a properly executed weld, it is often the only fused
joint which has a melting point substanti,_ly equal to that of
the bulk structure. This is a potent safety factor where, in
the advent of an accidental fire, a melted joint could release
additional large quantities of fuel. In large Systems, such
failures could develop into a "chain reaction" affair. For this
reason all general purpose liquid or gaseous hydrogen systems
should be constructed of high melting point materials.
(2) Welded Joints
Welding is the first preference for all hydrogen systems and all
forms of welding can be used. The type of weld to be used is gen-
erally determined by factors other than the fact that the system
is for hydrogen use. Heliarc is generally preferred for joining
light gauge stainless steel and is often preferred for construc-
tion of vacuum jacketed equipment. Conventional arc techniques
are also used extensively especially for heavy gauge material
where cost is a strong factor. Filler material and stress re-
lieving requirements are determined by the parent material to be
joined and normal standard practices should be followed.
(3) Silver Solde r Joints
No unique problems have been encountered with these materials.
The choice of solder composition is determined by ease of appli-
cation to the material to be joined. Silver solders are recom-
mended for joining copper base materials and for joining dis-
similar metals such as copper to stainless steel. The melting
point must be greater than iO00OF.
(4) Soft Solder Joints
(a)
(b)
Soft solder joints are not permissible in hydrogen systems
except in non-critical locations such as wiring which, if
it failed, would not result in a hazardous condition.
Soft solder joints are unacceptable for two reasons. First,
the solder has a low melting point and will quickly fail in
case of fire, releasing more hydrogen. Second, soft solders
containing tin may become crumbly and lose all strength at
cryogenic temperatures.
2O
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g. Pressure Tests
(i) New equipment shall be tested in accordance with
appllcable codes.
(2) _Taqqinq of Pressure Vessels
All pressure vessels shall be tagged to show
the date and level of test.
(3) Le_k Tes_____t
A helium leak test by mass spectrometer shall be made on liquid
hydrogen containers before and after the vessel or piping is cold
shocked by liquid nitrogen. No leak shall be permitted which can
be detected at the moss sensitive leak rate position on the mass
spectrometer.
h. Cont(_nination
(l) Use of Filters
Adequate filters shall be used on hydrogen and associated systems.
The filter system shall be placed so as to effectively collect the
impurities in the system and shall be accessible for cleaning.
(2) Types of Filters
(3)
Filters with slntered-metal elements are not recommended for
liquid hydrogen or other cryogenic systems, because the little
bails of metal tend to spa]l off and get into sensitive parts
of the system. Filter elements made of non-calendered woven
wire mesh are preferred. The filter should retain I00% of
particles greater than 150 microns in diameter, as a'generai rule.
However, some systems may require more stringent standards.
Interconnected Systems
(a) Interconnection of Systems
_. When interconnection of different systems operating at
21
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different pressure levels would damage a lower pressure
system, adequate means to prevent such damage shall be
provided,
2- For example: If a third system must be supplied at
times from a high pressure supply system and at other
times from a lower pressure system, the lower pressure
system may be protected by:
Providing a non-standard spool piece which can be
placed in alternate pc_itions in the interconnect-
ing piping so as to isolate the high and low pressure
systems from each other.
Providing a non-standard elbow which can be swung
Into alternate positions so as to isolate the high
end low pressure systems from each other. In this
and the foregoing design, blank flanges will effect
necessary changes. A tee may not be substituted
for the elbow.
._Co If it is necessary to have piping installed so that
the third system may be supplied through valves from
either the. high or low pressure, syst_n, a relief valve
or frangible disc may be used to protect the low
pressure system. If desired, a small relief valve,
capable of relasing expected leakage through the
control valve and set to release at a pressure below
the breaking pressure of the frangible disc, may be
used in parallel with the frangible disc.
de Pressure regulating valves, shut-off valves and check
valves do not provide adequate protection for low
pressure systems which are connected to high pressure
systems. Because of this fact, means must be provided
for pressure relief in the low pressure system.
Explosion hazards in interconnected process systems,
dewars, tanks, storage bottles, etc., as might be caused
by leakage of hydrogen from one system into another shall
be prevented by application of the following principles:
_. The tightness of valves of any type shall not be
relied upon as a means of avoiding unwanted leakage.
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bQ Under circumstances similar to those described in the
foregoing for over-pressurizatlon, like means of
protection may be employed.
Co In cases in which the pressure differences in the
systems cannot be used in conjunction with relief
valves for preventing unwanted leakage, the hydrogen
supply shall be disconnected and capped when the
system is not in active use. (A combustion chamber
connected to an altitude exhaust system is an example
of this kind.)
(b) .Check Valves
_o For bubble-free tiqhtness check-valves shall nor be used.
Two check-valves in series have been found to be unreliable.
In fact, in some cases, a single check-valve has been more
leak proof because the larger pressure drop closesthe
check-valve more tightly.
x
Instances have occurred of the contamination of bottled
gases, because of check valves leaking in interconnected
systems. Suppliers of bottled gases specifically pro-
hibit contaminating gases in their bottles. Further, the
safety of laboratory operations requires that bottled
gases must not be contaminated. Check-valves might be
completely tight at the start of service and develop
leaks after being in service. If the contaminant pressure
must be higher than the bottle pressure, two shut-off
valves with a bleed valve between them must be used. If
desired, a check-valve may be used in the vent line, to limit
the influx of air. Check-valves may be used if bottle
pressures are not Permitted to fall within 25 psig of the
contaminating pressure. That is, a safety pressure margin
must be maintained.
_. Check-valves may be used in cases where system contamin-
ation is not important.
Apparatus in which hydrogen is used must be equipped with vents for
normal operating requirements. In addition, special vent capacity may
23
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be required to protect the equipment in the event of an explosion. Vents
should be placed so as to avoid possible contamination of air intakes
leading into a building. The vent discharge shall be at |east 15 feet
above any roof peaks or parapet.
(!) Vent _uantities
(a) Allowable vent quantities from a single vent are subject to
conditions such as wind direction and velocity, proximity of
""airplanes, distance from dwellings, etc.
(b) The effect of wind is to prevent gas from a vent from accumu-
lating and to channel the gas in a stream downwind. Generally,
the higher the wind velocity, the farther the stream of gas
extends before diffusion occurs, although turbulence greatly
increases the rate of diffusion. If the wind direction is
satisfactory, fairly large quantities of hydrogen can be dis-
sipated from a single vent. Generally, however, wlnd veloc_
and direction are not sufficiently reliable for this purpose.
(c) At Lewis Research Center-Cleveland, the allowable quantity of
unburned hydrogen from a single 2-inch pipe roof-vent has been
fixed at 0.25 lbs/sec, released at least 15 feet above a roof peak.
This limitation was adopted because the site is congested. Multiples
of these roof vents may be used at spacings of 15 feet and across the
prevailing wind. Use with wind parallel to the multiple vents is
questionable.
(d) At Plum Brook Station, an uncrowded area, the allowable flow of
unburned hydrogen is 0.5 Ibs/sec. from a single vent released
at least 15 feet above a roof peak.
(2) Interconnection of Vents
(a) if more than one vent discharge is connected to the same
vent stack, there is danger of over-pressurizing parts of
the vent system unless the size of the vent is sufficient
to care for any eventuality. For example, if a burst disc
ruptures and over-pressurizes the vent system, the flow may
back into parts of the system incapable of taking the pres-
sures involved. In another example, over-pressurization of
the vent system changes the effective release pressure of
al_ relief valves and burst discs connected to the vent system.
in this manner, over-pressure in the vent system could cause
over-pressure and failure of connected apparatus.
24
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(b) Therefore, avoid the connection of high pressure, high capacity vent
discharges and low pressure vent discharges to the same vent
stack unless the vent capacity is sufficient to avoid over-pressuri=
zation of the weakest part of the system.
(c) The discharge from vacuum pumps handling hydrogen shall be
ducted to suitable vents.
(3) Ventinq of Explosions
(a) Tests show that the maximum explosion pressure produced in
a tank containing hydrogen-air mixture at atmospheric pres-
sure is about 70 psi when the vent area is one square foot
per IO0 cubic feet of tank volume. With a ratio of 4 square
feet per I00 cubic feet, the maximum explosion pressure
drops to about 25 psig. In pipe lines or long narrow tanks,
it may not be possible or practical to provide effective
venting against an explosion.
(b) Explosion vents shall not be connected to vent syste_ns for
hydrogen gas.
sposa! "
(I) Hydroqen Disposal by Burninq
Disposal of larger quantities of hydrogen than can safely be
handled by roof vent systems is best accomplished in a "burn-off"
system in which the liquid or the gas is piped to a remote area
and burned with air in a multiple burner arrangement. Such
systems are operated with pilot ignition means, warning systems
in case of flame-out, and means for purging the vent line.
Attention shall be given to the stress, thermal contraction,
and support prob]ems of the long pipe lines involved. Consider-
ation shall be given to removal of ignitable substances in the
vicinity and hazards to low-flying airplanes. (See Appendix 5
for discussion of fI_rne heights on hydrogen burn-offs.)
(2) Hydroqen, Oisposal Into Laboratory Exhaust Systems
Unburned hydrogen may be dumped into the exhaust systems only
under the following conditions=
(a) Lean Mixture 0perations
It shall be permissible to introduce into the exhaust system
2S_
hydrogen-air mixtures leaner than 0.0068 by weight. This
figure is based on known detonation limits and not on
the lower limit of flammability. This statement applies
to all phases of operation including engine blowout,
failure to start, etc. In the calculation of fuel-air
ratio, non-condensable inert gas which is added to the
system may be considered as "alr."
(b) Safe Operation by Des iqn of System
Fuel-air mixtures richer than 0.0068, by weight, may be in-
troduced into an exhaust system providing the entire system
is capable of withstanding a detonation of the mixture. The
system shall be capable of withstanding pressures 20 times
the maximum operating pressure except for heads, baffles,
elbows, and other types of obstructions which must withstand
60 times the maximum operating pressure. Because the reaction
time is of such short duration, ultimate stress values may be
used.
(c) Use of Water Sprays
No combustor or engine shall be operated without we11-dis-
persed water sprays in the exhaust. Experience indicates
that multiple bank sprays w|11 partially suppress the deton-
ation pressures and will reduce the number and temperatures
of ignition sources in the exhaust system. Water sprays
shal] not be relied upon as a means of avoiding detonations.
CO 2 may be used with the water spray to further reduce
hazards.
4. ELIMINATION OF IGNITION SOURCES
a. General . Procedure
(I) Even with the best of efforts to contain hydrogen, inadvertent
leaks and accumulations will occur.
(2)
(3)
The qeneral.procedure is to eliminate all likely !qnltlon sources
or place them away From fire hazard area
However, experience shows that escaped hydrogen is very easily
ignited by unexpected means. Prudence dictates that the first
emphasis must be on containment, ventilation I and detection.
Elimination of ignition sources is the second, not the first,
line of defense.
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If Ignition sources are a required part of the hydrogen test,
provision shall be made that any explosion or fire that may
result will be an acceptable safety risk.
bo Potentia| iqnitiOE Sources
(|) Friction Sparks
(a) Friction sparks are caused by hard objects coming into
forcible contact with each other. That is metal striking
metal, metai striking stone, or stone striking stone.
(b) A friction spark is a particle of burning metal which has
been sheared off as a result of contact. Initially, the
particle is heated by mechanical energy of friction and
impact converted into heat. The freshly exposed surface
of the particle may oxidize at the elevated temperature to
cause an increase of temperature until the particle is
heated to incandescence.
(c) Sparks struck from hand tools are considered as having low
total energy. Sparks from mechanical tools such as drills
and pneumatic chisels generate high energy sparks.
(Reference: Sparking Characteristics and Safety Hazards of Metallic
Materials Technical Report No. NGF-T-I-57 NAVORD Report
5205)
(2) Impact Sparks
(a) Impact sparks are also caused by hard objects coming into
forcible contact with each other.
(b) Impact sparks are produced by impact on a quartzitic type
rock such as the sand in concrete. Quartz is piezo-electric
and can convert mechanical into electrical energy. As in
the case of friction sparks, small particles of the impacted
material are thrown off. These particles, however, do not
oxidize and, therefore, lose heat after the initial impact.
(3)
(Reference: As for Friction Sparks)
Elect rica!_S_arks
(a) Electrical sparks are caused by sudden electrical discharges
between objects having different electrical potentials, for
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example, breaking electrical circuits or discharges of static
electricity. These sparks may carry tremendous amounts of
energy in comparison with friction sparks.
(Reference: As for Friction Sparks)
(b) Static electricity will generate sparks which will ignite a
hydrogen-air or hydrogen-oxygen mixture. Static electricity
is caused by many common articles such as hair or fur when
combed or stroked or by a leather belt when operating on a
machine. People generate high voltage,charges of static
electricity on themselves, especially when walking on dry
ground, wearing nylon or other synthetic clothing, sliding
on automobile seats, or combing the hair. Flowing liquid or
gaseous hydrogen causes charges of static electricity. This
is true also for all non-conductive liquids or gases. Tur-
bulence in containers as well as laminar flow in systems
has the same effect. Static charges may be induced during
electrical storms.
(4) Hot Obiects _ FIa(nes, Smoklnq
(a) Objects at temperatures over lO00°F will cause ignition of
hydrogen-air or hydrogen-oxygen mixtures at atmospheric
pressure (or about 650OF prolonged contact at less than
atmospheric pressure).
(b) Both flames and smoking are easily capable of igniting
hydrogen mixtures.
c. Eliminatio n of iqnition Sources Due to Electrical Equipment and Wirin9
(Reference: National Electrical Code (NEC) )
(1) Electrical Classification of Hydroqen Areas
Areas where f|ammable hydrogen mixtures are normally expected to
occur shall be classified as Class I Group B Division I. Areas
where hydrogen is stored, transferred, or used, and where the
hydrogen is normally contained shall be classified as C]ass 1
Group B Division 2 as a minimum. In deciding whether an area will
actually be made safer by the more expensive and difficult Divl-
sion I installation° the NEC should be consulted and the follow-
ing facts should be kept in mind:
(a) A Division I installation differs from a Division 2 instal]-
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d.
lists the sizes of grounding conductors; however, the
minimum size used for grounding fixed equipment in Class 1
areas shall be No. 2 A,WoG.
Elimination of Other lqnition Sources
(I) Liqhtninq Protection
Lightning protection in the form of lightning rods, aerial cable,
and ground rods suitably connected should be provided at all pre-
paration, storage and use areas. All equipment in buildings
should be interconnected and grounded to prevent inducing sparks
between equipments during lightning strokes. A further deveiop_
ment of this subject is in the National Bureau of Standards
Handbook 46 "Code for Lightning Protection." The area protected
by lightning rods or aerial cable is considered to be within
30 degrees of either side of the vertical.
(2) Static E Iect r ic__ity_
In spite of all precautions, static sparks may still occur from
unknown sources. Nevertheless, the following measures shall
be taken:
(a) Ground all metal parts of a test rig and structure enclosing it.
(b) Use conductive machinery belts.
(c) Avoid combing the hair.
(d) Be sure personnel ground themselves before touching or
using a tool on dewars or vents.
(el Avoid wearing clothes made of nylon or other synthetic,
silk, or wool. Ordinary cotton clothing is satisfactory.
(f) Keep furred animals out of hydrogen areas.
(3) "Spark-proof" Tools
(Reference: Sparking Characteristics and Safety Hazards of Metallic
Materials, '_ Tech. Rept. NGF-T-l-57 NAVORD Rept. 5205)
(a) Tests and experience have shown that so-called 'gspark°proof"
tools are not spark-proof and do cause ignitions.
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ation mainly in the degree of isolatlon of the area from
ignition sources that may occur in the electrical system.
A Olvision i installation relies heavily on explosion proof
enclosures.
(b) An exploslon-proof enclosure is no_..._tgas-tight. It is
flame-tight. Flame-tight means that the enclosure is strong
enough to contain the pressure produced by ignition of a
flammable mixture inside; and that the joints and threads
are tight and long enough to prevent issuance of any flames
or any gases that are hot enough to ignite a surrounding
flammable mixture.
(2) Equipment,
(a) All electrical sources of ignition shall be prohibited in
classified areas, including open electrical arcing devices
and heaters or other equipment which operates at elevated
temperatures. This means using approved explosion-proof
equipment, Class I Group B Division I, or selecting non-
arcing equipment approved for Division 2. NEC Articles
500 and 501 cover the equipment application and Install-
atlon methods for Class I locations.
(b) When properly classified equipment is not available, general
purpose equipment' in general purpose housing may be used
when continuously pressure-purged with clean air or nitrogen.
Positive indication of continued purge shall be provided.
(c) In any installation, the cost of equipment and installation
will be reduced if those items which might become ignition
sources are located outside the hazardous area.
(d) Also, systems installed in the hazardous area but not required
during hazardous periods may be built with general purpose equip-
ment, with provision to disconnect them before the hazardous
period begins. The conduits for such systems must be sealed in
accordance with NEC requirements wherever they leave the hazardous
area. Seals must be checked to verify that they are effective.
(3) G round inq
(a) All equipment and connections, fixed or movable, shall be
grounded.
(b) NEC Article I00 defines the term "grounded'," and Table 250-9_
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(b) Further, with hydrogen, the energy required for ignition is
so small that the so-called '|spark-proof" too]s reduce the
hazard ineffectively and give a false feeling of security.
(c) "Spark-proof" tools are not required.
(d) However_ a11 too!s shall be used with caution tO prevent
slippinq, qlancinq blows ' or droppinq, a!l of whic h would
cause spark_.
Spark-Proof and Conductive Floors
These are not required as the same comments apply as for "Spark-
pro, if' Tools. However, if such floors are used, care shou]d be
exercised not to destroy the safety properties by cutting the floor,
painting with non-dOnductive pain.t.,_or allowin_.Lt t_.get dirty.
(5) Hot Objects _ Flames, Smokinq
(a) Exclusion areas shall be established around hydrogen
faciIities and clearly'marked. Barricades, signs, and
.warning lights should be used, as appropriate.
(b) The larger or more hazardous the facility, the larger the
exclusion area should be. Boundaries should be set with
the concurrence of the appropriate safety authority. A
minimum radius of 50 feet is recommended.
o
(c) Inside the exclusion area, smoking shall be prohibited.
{d) Except as they occur normally during tests, flames and objects
above 80% of the ignition temperature shall also be prohibited.
Welding and cutting will not be performed when hydrogen is
present.
(6) Flame Arrestors
(a) Flame arrestors rely on the fact that a flame will be quenched
if sufficient heat can be removed from the gas by the arrestor.
The quenching distance is the spacing between parallel walls
which will just permit a flame to pass. Quenching distance
for hydrogen is on the order of I/4 that of other fuels. As
the pressure increases, the quenching distance decreases.
(b) Flame arrestors designed for hydrocarbon flames will not
hyd roqen flames.
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(c) Sintered bronze flame arrestors are effective in stopping
hydrogen flames. Porosity, area, thickness, duration of
flame, mixture, pressure, and mass flow are factors that
must be considered. Sintered stainless steel is not as
effective as sintered bronze.
(Reference Fourth Symposium on Combustlon (1953) page 689)
(d) Flame arrestors made of metal screen can also be effective
against hydrogen if properly constructed and assembled
(e) Use only flame arrestors that are specifically designated
for hydrogen applications and follow installation direc
tions carefully.
if) Arrestors that are effective against hydrogen-air flames
will not necessarily stop hydrogen-oxygen flames,
5. PROTECTION OF PERSONNEL AND E_UIPMENT
a. Presence of Personnel In Test Rooms
(I) Despite the provision for safety equipment and the experienced
judgment of the project engineer, every entrance into an opera-
ring test cell must be considered dangerous. It is, therefore,
recommended that reasonable steps be taken to avoid the need
for entering.
(2) Entrance into operating test cells shall only be made by authorized
personnel after the severity of operating conditions has been re-
duced, (pressure, speed and temperature) and only if the project
engineer and personnel entering deem such entrance to be both safe
and neces,sar_.
(3) Cells in which combustible mixtures are present shall not be
entered under any condition.
(4) The presence of personnel in an operating test cell shall be known
to personnel outside the test ceil.
o
b. Personnel Shelters
Shelters for personnel should be self-sufficient so that there is no
reason to evacuate the shelter during an emergency. Telephone and air
lines to the shelter shall be protected from damage. Air supply lines
shall be provided with filters to remove oil vapor.
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(|) Ventilation for Shelters
Particular attention shall be paid to the ventilation or source
of air for shelters that may, in case of emergency_ be enveloped
in combustible or the products of combustion.
(2) Release of Inert Gas Inside Shelters
Inert gases under pressure should not be piped into tightly
sealed shelters if there is a possiblity of accidental release
and suffocation from lack of oxygen.
(3) Fuel in Shelters and Control Rooms
Fuel shall not be piped into shelters or control rooms,
(4) Visual Observation
Any window opening into a test cell where excessive pressures
or ricocheting fragments could be present must be considered a
hazard. |f a window is required, it should be made as small as
practical and should be of bullet-proof glass or the equivalent.
A mirror system or a movable steel panel can be used to advantage
in sclne cases.
Barricades
(1) Need for Barricades
Barricades are often needed in hydrogen test areas to shield
personnel, dewars, and adjoining areas from blast waves and/or
fragments. Barricades may also be needed to isolate liquid
hydrogen storage areas from public property to which they might
other._ise be too close (see Section 6). The purpose of barri-
cades here is two-fold.
(a) To protect uncontrolled areas from the possible rupture and
fragmentation of a storage dewar. This is a rather remote
possibility, but such accidents have happened.
(b) To protect the dewars from malicious or thoughtless gunfire.
{2) Confinement
Barricades must not cause excessive confinement, which might lead
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to detonation rather than simple burning of escaped hydrogen. For
example, liquid hydrogen spill tests conducted inside an open-
ended (U-shaped) bunker, without a roof, produced detonation of
the hydrogen-air mixture.
(a) Whether or not this would happen in a given case would depend
on the relative height, length, and spacing of the walls.
However, there are no guiding rules, and it is therefore
best to avoid wrapping barricades around hydrogen areas.
Sometimes this can be accomplished by placing a barricade
closer to the thing to be protected, instead of closer to
the source of spilled hydrogen.
(b) Straight or gently curving barricades are acceptable.
(3) Heiqht of Barricades
The proper height and length of a barricade may be determined
as follows:
Any straight line drawn from the top boundary of the area
In which blast or fragments will originate, to any part of a
building, dewar, etc., that is to be protected or to any point
12 feet or less above the center of that portion of a highway
which would be too close without a barricade, must pass through
the barricade. °
6. STORAGE AND TEST LOCATIONS AND BLAST EFFECTS
a. Quantity-Distance Concept
Quantity-distance criteria are based on the obvious fact that the
effects of fire, explosion, and detonation can be reduced to toIerab4e
levels if the source of hazard is kept far enough from people and
facilities. Tests and experience are employed to detemine how the
effects of an accident are related to the quantity of material involved
in the accident, in the case of hydrogen, these effects are blast
waves, fragments, and infra-red radiation. Other tests and physical
laws show how these effects diminish with increasing distance from
the source. Finally, from a knowledge of the tolerance levels of
people and structures, safe distances are determined. These distances,
therefore, are based entirely on the estimated damage that could
result from an incident, without considering probabilities or frequency
of occurrence.
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(1) The quantlty-distance relations are intended as a basic guide
in the choice of sites and separation distances. The distances
given are based on the total quantity of propellants present.
This may be unrealistic because proper design can sometimes
guarantee that only part of the propellants will be involved in
an accident. If safety authorities are satisfied that such
positive safeguards exist, appropriate lesser distances may be
used.
(z) Safety authorities may also waive separation distance require-
ments where small quantities of liquid hydrogen are used in well-
controlled laboratory experiments.
c. Quantity-O, istance Tables
(1) The Armed Services Explosives Safety Board, in consultation with
the Armed Services and NASA, has developed quantity-distance
tables for liquid h?drogen. These are published as Department
of Defense Instruction 4145.21, January 27, 1967. The tables
given in this Part are adapted from Instruction 4145.21.
(2) Two different situations are considered. One is the storage
of |iquid hydrogen, where the main hazards are pressure rupture
and gas-phase burning of hydrogen in air. The other is the use
of liquid hydrogen in propulsion systems together with liquid
oxidizers, where the main hazard is detonation of liquid hydrogen-
solid oxidizer mixtures.
(a) Storaqe
6 Applicability - It is assumed that the liquid hydrogen
storage area is unconfined and that suitable dikes or
run-off paths are provided. A storage area is one in
which the only activity is associated with retaining
and transferring liquid hydrogen into and out of dewars
at nominal transfer pressures. A supply dewar associated
with a specific test facility will not necessarily qualify
as a storage area with respect to fixing the separation
distances for the facility, even though the tests may not
involve liquid oxidizers.
_. Definitions
a. Ln_b]e Storaqe - Strong oxidizers and explosives
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must be stored a suitable distance from hydrogen. The
oxidizers include oxygen, fluorine, concentrated nitric
acid, nitrogen tetroxide, chlorine trifluoride, and
hydrogen peroxide. Explosives include blasting
materials, ordnance, and unstable chemicals such as
pentaborane.
Protected - The term "protected" means shielded from
fragments.
Quantity - The quantity of liquid hydrogen refers to
the weight in pounds in a given container, if separ-
ated from another container with a lesser quantity
by the distances given in Table A, column 5. If
containers are not separated by the appropriate
distances, the quantity shall be the total in all of
them.
With Liquid Oxidizers
Applicability - Where liquid hydrogen is Used in conJunc-
tion with liquid oxidizers such as oxygen or fluorine, as
in engine static test or lauch operations, the quantity-
distance criteria are based on blast hazards. The total
amount of propellants (fuel plus oxidizer) that could be
involved in accidental release must be related to an
equivalent amount of TNT or similar high explosive that
would produce the same blast wave overpressure.
Oeterminat.ion of Explosive Equiya!e0t - A given total
quantity of liquid hydrogen plus oxidizer, accidentally
released, can be expected to produce a blast wave char-
acteristic of some smaller amount of high explosive.
To determine the equivalent amount of explosive, multiply
the amount of propellants by the following factors, and
then enter Table B with the results to determine the
separation distance.
.
o
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Propellant
Combination
Explos[ve Equivalent Factor
Static Tests Stands Range Launch Pads
LH 2 - LO 2 0.60 0.60
LH 2 + RP-i - LO 2 Sum of 0.60 for LH2-LO 2 Sum of 0.60 for LH2-LO 2
0.10 for RP-I-LO 2 0.20 for RP-I-LO 2
LH 2 - LF2 0.05 *' -
* Arbitrarily taken to be the same as the equivalent established
for another hypergoIic combination, N20 4 - Aerozine-50, in
Department of Defense Instruction 4145.21. Toxic hazards not
considered may be overriding.
(c) Use Without Liquid Oxidizers
No quantity-distance relations have been established for oper-
ations involving liquid hydrogen alone, such as pump or heat-
transfer tests. The work and the conditions under which it is
carried out are so variable that no hard-and-fast rules can be
set down. Each test setup must be considered separately to
determine the possible results of accidents, keeping in mind
the likelihood of contamination by liquid air and the danger
of detonation if gaseous hydrogen-air mixtures are formed
in confined spaces.
d. Bl.ast-Wave Characteristics
When an explosive material detonates near the ground, a hemispherically-
expanding shock, or blast wave, is generated. The strength of the wave
decreases as it moves outward from the site of detonation; and, of
course, the strength at any given distance is related to the amount of
material detonated.
(I) The term "strength" refers to several characteristics of a blast
wave which relate to the wave's potential for causing damage:
(a) Peak Overpressure - The static pressure (often called "side-on"
pressure) is greatest at the wave front. This is the peak
overpressure, generally reported as psi above atmospheric
pressure.
Sect. 6d
(2)
(3)
(c)
(d)
(e)
However, it is the du_ation of the positive phase - the tlme
required to drop from the peak overpressure to atmospheric
pressure - which is of greatest significance in causing damage.
Bi_st,Wiqd Velocity - Behind the front of the blast wave, the
air moves at consideFable speed in the same direction as the
wave. :or exampTe, if the peak overpressure is 5 psi, it will
be accompanied by a !60 mph wind.
Dynamic 0veqFTess,Jre - The pressure rise produced when the
blast-wind is brought to rest is called the dynamic over-
pressure.
Peak Reflected Cverpressu__ - if a blast wave strikes a surface
(such as a wa=;) at normal incidence, the air flow will be
stopped and _ shock wave will reflect backward from the surface.
Behind the reflected shock, the surface will briefly be sub-
jected to the peak reflected overpressure; this is sometimes
called the "face-on" overp-essure, it is considerably larger
than the stagnation ove_pressure, which is the sum of the
peak and dynamic overpressures.
The most frequently quoted property of blast waves is the peak
overpressure. Figure 6-I shows curves of peak overpressure versus
distance for various weights of TNT. However, it is not necessary
to present a separate curve for each amount of explosive. Peak
overpressure is subject to what is called "cube-root scaling."
That is, the disEance at which a given peak overpressure occurs
is proportional to the cube root of the weight of explosive. Con-
sequently, all of the curves in Figure 6-| could be superimposed
on the curve fer one pound of explosive if, instead of distance,
the distance divided by the cube root of the weight were plotted
against overpressure. This correlating parameter, (FT/LBSI/3),
is called scaled distance," and it will be used in order to
simplify the presentation of the remaining blast-wave characteris-
tics.
The material in Figures 6-I to 6-5 was adapted from Naval Ordnance
Laboratory figures which were prepared for Volume I, Propellant
Hazards Manual, currently being written under the auspices of the
Interagency Chemical Rocket Propulsion Group. In all cases, the
data are for TNT blast waves. Tests now underway indicate that
the waves produced by detonation of the liquid hydrogen - liquid
oxygen combination do not have precisely the same properties.
Nevertheless, Figures 6-I to 6-5 may be used to get an overall
view of propellant blast effects, and for estimation purposes.
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e. Effects Of Blast Waves On Structures
When a blast wave strikes a large building, it will exert forces tending
to translate the building and to crush it. The crushing effect occurs
because the p_essure outside is greater than the atmospheric pressure
inside. The translating effect occurs because of the pressure differ-
ence which exists while the wave is traversing the structure, and be-
cause of the dynamic pressure of the blast-wind. Objects which are
subject to such combinations of forces in a blast are called diffrac-
tionstructures.
(I) On the other hand, smaller objects such as utility poles, chimneys,
and small buildings which do not extend very far in the direction
of blast-wave motion, will not be subjected to appreciable static-
pressure differentials. Almost all of the blast effect on such
objects is due to the drag which they present to the blast-wlnd.
Therefore, they are called draq structures.
(2) There is not always a hard-and-fast line between the two kinds of
structures. For instance, a building whose wails are mostly glass
may be more a drag structure than a diffracting structure; this
could happen if the windows quickly broke, equalizing the internal
and external pressure and exposing the structural supports to the
blast wind. It can be seen that there will also be intermediate
cases, in which the initial impact of the blast only partially
opens the building, so that it is subject to both diffraction and
drag effects.
(3) In principle, it is possible to calculate blast effects from a
knowledge of blast-wave properties, the strength of materials,
and the structural load-response. In practice, such calculations
are very difficult because of the complex effects described in
the preceding paragraphs, it is generally easier to be guided
by prior experience, which has established the ranges of over-
pressure that will cause either severe I or moderate 2 damage to
different types of construction. Considerable information of
this kind exists, but it will not be given in detail here;
instead, it will be considered in relation to the quantity-
distance table (Table B).
1 Building not usable without almost complete reconstruction
2 Major repairs required to load-bearing members.
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f_ Effects of Blast Waves At Separation .Ois_ance_ .Specified in Table B
Comparison of the quantity-distance requirements of Table B with the
data of Figures 6-1 and 6-4 shows that the Table is designed to place
inhabited buildings at an unbarricaded distance such that they will ex-
perience a peak overpressure of about 0.5 psi and a dynamic overpressure
of about 0.01 psi.
(1) If the source of the blast is barricaded, the Table permits shorter
separation distances. Perhaps because of this, it is common miscon-
ception that barricades reduce the overpressures experienced at
large distances. This is not the case. After the blast wave
passes the barricade, it will re-form with almost the same strength
as it would have if no obstacle were in the way. Thus, over-
pressures at the barricaded distances will be approximately twice
as great as Chose cited in the previous paragraph. The barricade
only serves to stop fragments.
(a) Effects on Bui_
Blast-damage data show that, of the most c_mon types of
construction, wood-framed and masonry buildings are the
most vulnerable. Wood-fremed buildings will sustain
moderate-to-severe damage at peak overpressures of 2.4
to 3.3 psi. Masonry buildings will sustain moderate-to-
severe damage at peak overpressures of 4.0 to 4.7 psi.
!-_ Most other types of construction are more sensitive
to dynamic overpressure than to peak overpressure.
However, even the most vulnerable buildings in this
group wi|l not suffer moderate damage unless the
dynamic overpressure exceeds 0.15 psi.
_. Other sources of information suggest that the dis-
tances in Table B are not great enough to prevent
plaster damage, but are great enough to prevent
deformation of window frames. It is not possible
to be explicit about the level of damage that would
be sustained by other structural components, but
indications are that it would be minor with the
fo|lowing exception.
(b) Effects on Glass
The exception referred to above is window glass. The damage
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threshold varies widely, depending on the area, thickness,
and mounting of the glass. How_ve:0 at a peak overpressure
of 1 psi, a large fraction of all windows will break; and
at 0.5 psi, a significant amount of breakage can still be
expected_ Thin or poorly-mounted wlndcws break at over-
pressures as low as 0.15 psi in laboratory tests. In the
field, breakage has often occurred at distances where the
overpressure should ):ave been only 0,03 psi. These cases
are probably due to the fact that blast waves can be channeled
and focused by winds and by at'ncspherlc temperature varia-
tions when they travel Ic,_g distances. Even if such cases
are neglected, there is s:,ll e la_ge range of overpressures,
from 0.15 to l psi, which may break glass_ Figure 6-1 shows
that there is a correspond:_g factor-of-ten uncertainty
in the dibtarces at _._Tc', hrokeP windows may be expected,
In short, Lhe separation dlst_Ices specified in Table B
will not: prevent glass dam_sie
(C) Effects on Humans
Humans are sensitive to two characteristics of blast waves:
peak overpressure and dynamic overpressure.
I 4 Peak overpressure can rupture eardrums at the 5 psi
level. At considerably hi.glue.- levels, direct internal
damage will result. There is approximately a one
percent chance of fatal injury at overpressures of 35
to 45 psi, and a 99 percent chance at 55 to 65 psi°
The dynamic overpressure exerted by the blast-wind can
cause secondary inju_;es by picking people up and throw-
ing them A standing man _.,ill be moved by the wind
acco_panying a blast wave ;n which the peak overpressure
is 3 psi if he is lying do_._, stronger blasts will
be required to move hi_
Thus, humans in buildings located according to Table B
will not suffer any di_ec_ in_e_nal damage, nor will
they be thrown about.
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Pounds of LH 2
Over
Column l
TABLE A - LIQUID HYDROGEN STORAGE
Not Over
Column 2
Inhabited buildings, highways , Another LH 2
railroads, & incompatible storage storage
• iDistance tn feet Distance infeel
Unprotected Protected
Column 3 Column 4 Column 5
I00
500
I000
|0,000
50,000
lO0,O00
300,000
500,000
I00
500
I000
I0,000
50,000
.I00,000
300,000
500,000
II,O00,O00
600
600
600
6o0
1200
1200
1800
1800
1800
80
130
150
24o
320
365
440
h85
550
30
50
60
90
]20
135
165
180
205
Basis for Table A:
Column } - distances necessary for protection from fragments of tanks or
equipment
Column 4 - distances sufficient to prevent excessive heating by infrared
radiation; Bureau of .Mines Rept. 5707 (196i)
Column _ - reduced from column 4 to take into account the type of construc-
tion used in LH 2 storage areas
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TABLE B - LIQUID HYDROGENIN CONJUNCTIONWiTH LIQUID OXIDIZERS
Equivalent
weight of ex-
plosive, pounds
Distance in feet from explosive hazard
To ToPublic
Inhabited Bu 1dings Hi hwa s and Railroads
Not: over
100
200
300
400
500
60O
700
800
9O0
1,000
I,500
2,000
3,000
4,o00
5,ooo
6,000
7,000
8,000
9,0oo
Barricaded
190
235
270
295
320
340
355
375
390
400
460
505
580
635
685
73O
77O
800
835
Unbarricaded
380
470
540
590
640
680
710
750
780
800
920
lOlO
• !!60
1270
1370
1460
1540
160o
1670
Barricaded l
i15
140
160
175
190
205-
215
225
235
24O
275
3O5
35(
380
410
440
46O
480
500
Unbarr icaded
230
280
320
350
380
410
430
450
470
480
550
610
700
760
82O
88O
9_0
960
1000
oSect.
{continued) TABLE B - LIQUID HYDROGENIN CONJUNCTIONWITH LIQUID OXIDIZERS
n ,
Equivalent
weight of ex-
plosive, pounds
_k}tover
I0,000
15,000
20,000
25_,000
30,000
35,000
40,000
45,000
50,000
55,000
60,000
65,000
70,000
75,000 .
80,000
85,000
90,000
95,000
10o,000
|nhabited Bu
Barricaded ..
865
990
1090
1170
1245
1310
1370
]425
1470
1520
] 570
1610
1650
1690
1725
1760
1790
1825
1855
Distance in feet from explosive hazard
'' ' To r,
ildings
Unbarricaded Barricaded
1730
1780
I950
2110
2260
2410
2550
2680
2800
2920
3030
3130
3220
3310
3390
3_0
3520 •
3580
3630
®
To Publ ic
Highways and Railroads
520
595
655
700
745
785
820
835
880
910
940
965
990
1015
1035
1055
1075
I095
Ill5
Unbarr icaded
1040
1070
1170
1265
1355
1530
1610
1680
1750
1820
1880
]930
|985
2035
2075
2110
2150
2180
6f
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(conciuded) TABLE B - LIQUID HYDROGEN IN CONJUNCTION WITH LIQUID OXIDIZERS
Equivalent
weight of ex-
Distance in feet from explosive hazard
plos!ve, pounds To
Inhabited Buildings
I" ' !'"'UnbarricadedNot over Barricaded
125,000
150,000
175,000
200,000
225,000
250,000
.2115
2350
2565
2770
2965
3150
3679
3800
393O
406O
4190
431o
To.PubI'ic ......
Highways and Railroads ......
Barricaded
1270
1410
154O
1660
1780
1890
Unbarricaded
2200
2280
2360
2435
.... 2515
2585
Basis for Table B:
Department of Defense l,nstruCtioh 41_5.21, JanUary _71
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7. OPERATING PROCEDURES
a.
Safety is achieved, in working with hydrogen, by adherence to the
follow|ng:
(I) hydrogen leaks must be prevented, but
(2) a constant watch must be kept to detect immediately any accidental
leaks and proper action must be taken,
(J) accumulations of leaked hydrogen must be prevented by plentiful
ventilation.
(4) likely ignition sources must be eliminated but unknown ignition
sources must be suspected as being present.
b. personnel
(I) _ualified OPerators
(a) "There are two prime objectives in requiring qualified
operators. The first objective is to secure safe operations.
The second objective is to permit reliance on dependable
manual controls rather than on complex automatic
controls. Automatic controls are expensive to buy
and install, and experience has shown them to take valuable
research test time for adjustment and maintenance.
(b) Qualifications required for operation of hydrogen systems
shall be based on the engineers or mechanics having:
i- Physica], mental, and emotional fitness, especially
to act properly in emergencies.
_. Knowledge of t_e properties and characteristics of
hydrogen, both _iquid and gaseous.
o
_. Knowledge of the equipment and installation to be
operated.
_. Training and experience in operation under the instruc-
tion of a qualified operator.
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5. Operators of manufactured equipment, such as compressors,
must be familiar with manufacturers' manuals.
(c)- Although the policy requiring qualified operators applies
more directly to research test operations, safety requires
that the same policy apply to hydrogen handling other than
research.
(2) Number of Personnel Required
The "buddy" system must be followed; at least two qualified
personnel must be present. However, no more than a necessary
minimum of personnel shall be present in a hazard area.
(3) Personnel Protection
(a)
(b)
Personnel shall wear protective face shields, goggles, and
suitable clothing.
Synthetic clothing, such as nylon, shall not be worn because
it produces charges of static electricity that can cause
ignition of flammable gas. See Section 4, d, (2)° Gauntlet-
type gloves or tight clothing which will hold liquid against
the body must be avoided.
Storaqe
• Liquid hydrogen shall be stored in carefully constructed and tested
closed containers under at least 3 to I0 psig pressure to prevent air
from entering. The containers shall be vented through relief valves
to the atmosphere and carefully grounded. Rules pertaining to flammable
liquid or low-pressure gas storage are applicable. Dikes or their
equivalents should be used. The use of excessively high barricades
around storage areas is undeslrable because they retard dissipation
of any leaked hydrogen and may give conditions which could cause a
detonation. (See Section 5, c) Do not store_ transport_ or load
propellants toqether. (Refer to Section 6 for separ-
ation distance requirements.)
(!) Oewars
The dewar storage area shall be isolated by a 50-foot chained-off
distance. Warning signs, "No smoking within 50 feet," are
required.
52
I
Sect. 7c
(2) Electrical Groundinq
(3)
Oewars shall be adequately grounded at all times. Transfer
couplings should have bonding wires clamped across each joint.
Typical Vacuum Values
(a) Dewar vacuum and vacuum jacketed plumbing
(b)
Microns
Wa_ Cold (static)
o toso
In the event of the uncontrollable loss of vacuum, the dewar
contents will probably have to be transferred to another -
receiver and the dewar inerted preparatory for leak detection
and repair.
(4) Safety Valves
Liquid hydrogen expands about 800 times when warmed to room
temperature. If restrained, pressure of many thousand pounds per
square inch will result and may cause rupture of equipment and
hydrogen explosion or fire. Safety relief valves in dewars, in
systems, and between shut-off valves shall be tested for proper
operation periodically.
(5) ,BU r,Srt ,D,,! SOS
(6)
Replacement discs must be selected to be accurate duplicates of
the original and installed with extreme care. Burst dlsc assem-
blies fitted by the supplier wlth the pressure and vacuum supports
are preferred.
Contamination
(a) Conta_nlnation must be prevented. When liquid hydrogen is
exposed to air o_ other gases of higher boiling point, the
hydrogen will be Contaminated by either liquefied or solidi-
fied gases. Containers suspected of contamination must be
removed from service immediately to avoid further complica-
tions. The container shall be tagged or otherwise identified
as unfit for service. Arrangements shall be made for special
handling as soon as possible.
(b) Contamlnation might occur from interconnected systems, e.g.
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(7)
(c)
oxygen or impure-nitrogen syste_Is connected to hydrogen
systems. Therefore, check valves shall not be relied upon
,_Q prevent contamination.
When solid oxygen particles are formed, localized concentra-
tions approaching and reaching flammable range can occur.
Often, though, the quantity of oxygen with respect to toal
volume is still below the I ppm level. Since the vaporization
rate of liquid hydrogen increases tremendously in transfer
operations, the rate of oxygen accumulation will also increase,
for example, from impurities in the pressurizing hydrogen gas.
Where liquid is withdrawn from vessels frequently, accumula-
tion is less likely; but where liquid is stored, not used,
and tanks occasionaIIy "topped" to make up evaporation losses,
accumulation of higher boiling impurities (everything but
helium) wi]l take place. The approach is to eliminate all
oxidants from the hydrogen system
(d) The following precautions should be observed:
_. Hydrogen liquid should be stored under pressure (3-10 psig)
to aid in preventing external contaminants from entering
the system.
Pressuring hydrogen gas must be free as possible of impur-
ities, at least 99.6 percent pure. The levels of impuri-
ties, especially oxygen, should be known to assure that
it is a satisfactory pressuranto
All transfer or handling equipment, for both gas or liquid,
must be clean and dry and purged.
_. Hydrogen should not be re-circulated if contamination •
would be dangerous and cannot be prevented.
Decontamination
Periodic decontamination of a tank or dewar is to be done by draining
the contents and letting the product container warm-up to permit re-
moval of all contaminants. Roadab]e dewars, which may frequently be
connected to improperly cleaned and purged transfer systems, are
|ikely to become contaminated. Large fixed dewars, which are not
filled and emptied often, do not require decontamination unless they
have been inadvertently subjected to a contaminating condition.
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A decision to act then depends upon the degree of contamination and
becomes a matter of engineering judgment.
(a) To insure decontamination, the container shall be vacuum
purged - if strong enough to withstand a vacuum - to one
centimeter of mercury. If the dewar is not strong enough,
a warming or pressure purge will be necessary.
(8) Hazards 0f Subst'i tut inq Dewars
(a) Structural weakness of vessel. Liquid hydrogen and helium
dewars, as ordinarily constructed, are n_t strong enough to
hold liquid oxygen, air or nitrogen.
(b) Contamination danger.
(c) Although npt recommended , hydrogen and helium equipment can be
used interchangeably; no other substitutions are permitted
wlthout approval by the cognizant safety authorities.
Even with interchange of hydrogen and helium equipment, pur-
ging must be complete, Contents of dewar must be accurately
ma?ked on dewar.
d. Transportation
®
(|) J CC Requirements
(a) Dewars for the highway or rail transportation of liquid
hydrogen must have the required special permit of the
Interstate Commerce Co¢_nission.
(b) Transport dewars are to be marked in accordance to ICC
regulations with both of the following legends: FLA/4MABLE
GAS and LIQUID HYDROGEN.
(c) |CC special permits prohibit venting of hydrogen gas on the
highways. The pre_ure in the sealed dewar must be monitored.
if It shows signs of approaching the relief-valve se ing,
the truck must be driven to a safe place off the highway
and the pressure reduced through the manual biowdown valve.
(2) Nonna| Ventln_
(a) Choice of Location Although properly maintained modern
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transport dewars are we11-enough insulated to cross the
country without excessive pressure rise, there may be
occasions when the pressure slowly approaches the relief-
valve setting. Drive to an open area off the road_ clear of
power lines, buildings, and people. Consider wind direction
so that vented gas will be carried away safely.
(b) Time of Vent iqq. By observing the rate of pressure rlse,
try to plan the manual venting operation for the daylight
hours. In any event, the operation must be carried out
well before the automatic relief devices function.
(3) Emerqency Procedures
(a) Genera]. The first concern should be to prevent death or
injury. In event of accident or emergency, get the
dewar off the road if possibIe, preferably to an open loca-
tion. Shut off the tractor-trailer electrical system. Post
warning lights and signs and keep people at least 500 feet
away,
(b) Vent or Other Minor Fire. Attempt to shut off the supply of
hydrogen. Do not try to put out a hydrogen fire while it is
still being supplied with hydrogen. _ water hose is avail-
able, it should be used to keep metal parts cool until the
fire burns itself out. A fire extinguB_her should be used
to put out engine, tire, or electrical _ires that are not
fed by hydrogen.
(c) Cold Leaks. If there is no fire, "fo_ _ will be visible in
the vicinity of a liquid hydrogen leak. Stop or minimize
the leak if it can be done safely. Re,move all ignition
sources. There is flammable mixture v_erever fog is visible
and sometimes beyondthe visible clou_. "Do not deliberate|y
flare hydrogen leaks.
(d) Major Accident
!. In event of a major accident that _akes it impossible to
move the dewar off the road, post _arnings and keep
people away. Notify local authori:_ies and then home base.
_. If there is a large hydrogen fire @_n which the source of
hydrogen cannot be shut off, do n¢¢ allow firemen to ex-
tlnguish it. Have them use water streams to cool the
container and surrounding equipme_¢ and to put out second-
Sect. 7d
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_o If there has been major damage to the vacuum shell or
vent system, pressure may build up. in that case, the
liquid hydrogen container may rupture explosively. Keep
people at least 500 feet away. If the surface of the
Inner vessel is exposed, do not apply water; this would
only act as a heat source to the much colder hydrogen,
and would aggravate the boil-off.
If frost spots appear on the outer jacket, it means that
liquid hydrogen is contacting the carbon steel of which
It is usually made. This metal becomes brittle when
cold, and should not be struck or shocked lest it break.
(4) Personnel ,
The driver or an accompanying technician shall be familiar with the
hazards of hydrogen and with emergency procedures. Personnel
shall be fully trained and tested in the construction, operation,
and safety features of the dewar.
e. _System PrepaKation
(I) Cleanioq
(a) All storage, transfer and system components must be completely
clean before being placed in service.
(b) Liquid hydrogen systems must be clean of any surface film,.
oxidant, grease, or oil.
(c) Liquid hydrogen systems must be free of all matter that would
Jam or clog valves and flow passages; for example, rust, dirt,
m|l| scale, weld spatter, and weld flux.
(d) Valve stem seals and seats must be carefully inspected and
cleaned if necessary.
(e) The systems must be dry and free of water or any liquid of
boillng point h|gher than that of liquid hydrogen.
(f) A recommended cleaning procedure is as follows:
For a wam system, al| loose particles such as sand, grit,
rust, weld spatter shal| be removed by flushing _he system
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or component first with l, I, I-trichloroethane to de-
grease and second with demineralized water.
The system shall bedried by evacuation and flowing dry
nitrogen gas through it (if the system cannot withstand
a vacuum (See 4 below) To break loose attached particles,
the system shaTl be Hcold-shocked" with liquid nitrogen.
The particles then can be flushed out with liquid nitrogen
into filters. The filters shall then be cleaned separ-
ately.
Such systems should be dried by three cycles of evacuation
(see paragraph 7, f, (I) (a) on Purging) through a cold
trap before filling with hydrogen gas. Usually three
cycles will dry a system so that the cold trap shows no
further collection.
if the system cannot withstand a vacuum, the system may
be dried by flowing hot hitrogen gas through it. The
nitrogen gas temperature should be well above the boiling
temperature of water.
(g) Systems that have been cleaned shall have a11 openings closed
in an airtight manner with metal covers and suitable gaskets.
Good practice dictates similar treatment or the use of plastic
containers for pipes and systems that are yet to receive a
final cleaning.
(h) Experience indicates that factory-cleaned equipment is
frequently contaminated.
(2) Cleanin q Filters
(a) The frequency at which filters should be cleaned depends on
the amount of use and impurities in the fluid. The operators
must watch increases in pressure drops and clean filters
as needed.
(b) Filters are cleaned by disconnectinq, warming, draining,
flushing (use I, I, l-trichloroethane or ultrasonic cleaning)
and drying thoroughly. Filters must not be cleaned by back-
flushing through the system.
(3) Lubricants
(a) Combustible lubricants for valves, etc., must be avoided.
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The best lubricant for valves and fittings is graphite.
Find out which are approved lubricants and use them care-
fullyo Any lubricant must be prevented from getting into
liquid hydrogen,
{b) Silicone or KeI-F grease may be used (sparingly) on O-rings.
(4) Leak Prevention
(a) Seal materials suitable for low temperature and vacuum
service are required. Natural rubber freezes, hardens,
and loses its seal at low temperatures. Synthetic rubber,
Teflon, KeI-F, copper, brass, and stainIess steel, for
example, may be used as low temperature seals. Also see
Appendix 2.
(b) Avoid pipe threads because they are more subject to leaking.
Use welded fittings or flanged connections of suitable design.
(c) Use proper size _0_, rings.
(d) Systems must be mechanlcaliy tight.
(e) Check system for leaks while warm prior to activating system.
(f) Have adequate supports under temporary piping.
(g) Do not abuse equipment. Use proper tools.
(h) Do not overtighten valves.
(i) Do not attempt to tighten any fittings while cold, i. e.
below zero Fahrenheit.
(j) 00 not attempt to tighten any fittings while under pressure
even if warm.
(k) Do not backseat valves unless they are designed for backseatlng.
(l) Do not overpressurlze.
(m) Poor vacuum :insulation in transfer lines will cause a warm
seal to fall and liquid will squirt out.
(n) Be sure bayonet-type joints fit snugly.
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(5) Pressure Tests
All hydrogen containers and systems must be pressure tested in
accordance with applicable codes. Tests of the cryogenic por-
tions must include cold-shocking with liquid nitrogen followed
by additional pressure tests.
(6) Leak Detection
(a) After initial assembly or after alterations, check joints,
etc. for leaks with portable detector.
(b) Use portable or fixed combustible gas probes for hydrogen
operations. Be sure they are of a type approved for hydrogen,
(c) "Leak Tec i' or equivalent for warm systems.
(d) Watch for frosty clouds or visible condensation on surfaces
indicating leaks.
f. Pur_e Methods
(I) Vacuum Purqinq
In vacuum.purRinq, the operator must be sure the container or
system will not collapse when the vacuum is applied.
(a) Vacuum ,pur_e; air .to vacuum to inert qas _o_hvdroqen and
conversely --
o Initially the system is evacuated to I centimeter of
mercury. Then the system is tested under static conditions
to insure that it is tight by observing the rate of rise
of pressure within the system. (0ne'millimeter per minute
rise for a five-minute period would indicate good vacuum
holding ability.)
_. Next, nitrogen (or, if necessary, helium) is introduced to
a positive pressure of I psig. Then the system re-evac-
uated to I centimeter off mercury. The system is repressur-
ized wlth the inert-gas to I psig and then re-evacuated
to I centimeter of mercury. Now the system is ready for
hydrogen gas. The advantage of a vacuum purge is that a
minimum amount of helium purge gas would be used
if helium is required.
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° (b) Vacuum 0urqe; air to vacuum to hydroqen qas --
This method is slmilar to that stated abo_ except the inert
gas step is omitted. After initial evacuation to a few mill-
Imeters of mePcury, the system is purged with hydrogen gas and
evacuated for three complete cycles.
(2) Pressure Purqinq
Positive pressure purqe; air to inert qas to hydroqen -- The prin-
ciple of this method of purging is a progressive dilution of air
to reduce the percentage of residual air to a safe limit.
(a) Hydrogen purge gases must be at least 99.6% pure.
(b) Air in the system is displaced with an inert gas, helium, to
a positive pressure within the pressure range of the receiver.
The mixture is vented to atmosphere. The. system is repressur-
ized with helium to the positive pressure. Then the mixture
is again vented to atmosphere. The system is again pressur-
ized with helium and vented to atmosphere being careful to
|eave a positive pressure in the receiver to prevent air mi-
"gration. Hydrogen may now be introduced. A disadvantage of
thls method is that considerable quantities of helium
purge-gases are required. A second disadvantage is that it
Is difficult to determine if all voids or dead-legs have
been adequately purged.
(3) Purqin q Transfer Connections
In the event that neither of the foregoing purge methods can be
adapted to a transfer line, the line shall be purged by flowing
helium through special purge fittings that allow complete purging
end-to-end. Thls method should only be used for short lines such
as those used to connect roadable dewars to storage dewars.
g. Weldinq Procedure
(|) _d Inertinq Hydroqen Tanks or Systems for Weldinq
Consult with personnel who are familiar with the equipment concerned
and agree on the best method of purging and inerting. The general
procedure is to remove a11 of the hydrogen to a safe location and
fil| the tank or system with inert gas before welding as follows:
(a) Transfer all possib}e liquid or gaseous hydrogen out of the
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(b)
(c)
tank or system to other containers or, if necessary, dis-
charge safely to atmosphere.
Isolate the tank or section of the system to be welded to
further prevent return of any hydrogen. If possible, make
certain of isolation by disconnecting. (If not posslble to
disconnect, vent and purge continuously with an inert gas
as in paragraph 7, g, (1), (d), _.
Wam the entire tank or isolated section of the system to
at le..._astthe critical temperature of liquid hydrogen, minus
hOO°F. This will evaporate all the liquid hydrogen, Strip-
ping of insulation and preparation for welding can now be
done safely.
(d) For purging and inerting
.
_e
If the tank or system concerned is not leaking and is
stronq enouqh to withstand a vacuum (be sure of thls"_"
otherwise the tank or system wi1| collapse'_.
Evacuate to one centimeter of mercury absolute. Hold
this condition--without the vacuum pump operating--
for five minutes as an isolation, leak, and general
information check.
_. Fill the tank or system with gaseous nitrogen or argon
to about I psig.
_. Evacuate again as in (d), _, _ above.
_. FIll again with gaseous nitrogen or argon to about
I psig.
If the tank or system is stronq enouqh tO withstand a
vacuum but has a known leak, seal the leak with tape,
putty paints, grease, etc_ to obtain the I centimeter
of mercury, then proceed as for a non-leaking condition.
(see (d), !)
If the leak cannot be stopped, or its location is unknown,
or if the tank or system is not strong enough to withstand
a vacuum or if the section to be welded cannot be dis-
connected, then it is necessary to vent and purge contin-
_ with nitrogen or argon gas _ at about I pslg.
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(e) Sample and analyze the gas in the tank or system to be welded.
After two cycles of purging, as in (d), 1, above, the percent-
age of hydrogen remaining should be less than two-tenths of
one percent. Before _veldinq the percentaqe of hydrogen must
be !ess than 10 percent of the L.E,L. (Lower ExplOsive Limit)
for hydTrO_en in air (]ess than 0.4 volume percent of hydrogen
present,) •
(f) Maintain a small pressure, about l psig, of inert gas in the
tank or system, if the welding operation permits, to prevent
inward migration of air.
(g) Perform welding as required.
h. System Coolinq
(I) This optional method of preparing a warm vessel or system to receive
liquid hydrogen uses liquid nitrogen for pre-cooIing. The cooling
process evaporates large amounts of the cooling liquid which, if it
is hydrogen, may become a safety hazard. Steps to follow are:
(a) Evacuate the vessel or system to approximately 1 centimeter of
"mercury. (if this vacuum cannot be withstood safely, a
warm inert gas pressure purge should be carefully planned.)
(b) Introduce the liquid nitrogen slowly into the vessel or system
taking care to insure that there is no air migration which
would cause contamination.
(c) Allow amp|e time to obtain all of the cooling possible from
the liquid and cold gas.
(d) Drain off the remaining liquid nitrogen.
(e) Remove the nitrogen gas atmosphere by evacuating the vessel
or system to I centimeter of mercury. (See (I), (a) above.)
{f) Now introduce the hydrogen purge gas slowly. Continue the
flow until the vessel or system goes to a slight positive
p ressu re.
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(g) Now the liquid hydrogen may be admitted into the vessel or
system
i. Ventilation
(1) Plenty of ventiIation to avoid accumulation of leaked hydroqen qas
is a qreat aid in achievinq saf_ety in operations. Natural ventila-
tion, if adequate, is most reliable.
(2) Hydrogen diffuses rapidly if not confined. A spill of 500 gallons
of.liquid hydrogen will diffuse to non-explosive limits within
one minute if out-of-doors. At "room" temperature, hydrogen is
the llghtest of all gases, only one-fourteenth as heavy as air;
consequently, it rises. Therefore, inverted pockets will trap
hydrogen gas.
(3) "However, cold hydroqe _ at -418°F has the same density as aic at
laroofn" temperature and will not rise in air.
(4) Equipment containing hydrogen must not be covered so as to trap hydrogen.
j. Fuel Handllnq
(l) Receivinq Dewar _
Connect electrical ground. Inspect dewar generally for leaks or
mechanical defects, etc. Check dewar pressure and vacuum.
(2) Connectinq Lines
Clean connections. Purge all connecting lines and containers.
See paragraph 7, (f) on _'Purging." Avoid contamination.
(a) Watch for condensed'water on surfaces for this indicates leaks.
Make a check for leaks wlth a portable detector after each
assembly or alteration. Use minimum grease on "_' rings. Use
an approved vacuum grease such as Ke]-F or Dow-Corning
silicone.
(b) In the assembly of threaded pipe joints, the male portion
shall be screwed into the female portion one-third the
normal travel before applying a thread compound. The
thread compound shall only be applied to the male thread.
Teflon or KeI-F seal tapes may also be used with the same care.
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(3) pressurizinq Liquid Hydroqen
(a) See Checklist or operating instructions for particular
equipment.
(b) Only minimum number of personnel shall be allowed in area.
No personnel allowed around test instal)atlon.
(c) Do not use air or nitrogen (boiling point -]20°F) to pressur-
ize liquid hydrogen (boiling point -423°F). Contamination
will result because air or nitrogen will freeze. Self-
pressurizing or auxiliary hydroge,_ or helium gas required.
(d) Apply pressure slowly.
(el Do not exceed system limitation.
(4) Liquid Hydroqen Transfers.
All transfers shall be made In tightly closed systems. Liquid
hydrogen should not be transferred into an open-mouthed dewar or
be a]lowed to come into contact with air, for it can become con-
tamInated wlth solid air in this manner. Ground wires shall be
securely clanped across each coupling. These ground wires shall remain
connected until after the coupling is separated. A11 fuel transfers
shall be made against enough back pressure (about 3 psig) to
prevent air migration.
(5) Oisconne_tinq and Movinq Hydroqen Supply Containers from Test
Installatlons
Oewars and gas trailers should be disconnected from the test
equipment after operation. Dewars and gas trailers should
be moved from the test facility as soon as practical. In controlled
areas, where large dewars are utilized and disconnection may
constitute a hazard, the dewar(s) may remain connected between
research operations at the discretion of the test conductor•
Movements of dewars and tube trailers should be avoided during
peak traffic hours.
k. Check-off Sheets
(1) Check-off sheets are substantial aids to safe operations and, there-
fore, are required for all but T,e simplest installations.
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(2) In addition to the checklist of items pertaining to the specific
equipment, there shall be a checklist of items concerned with
safety of the test room and test area. There should be listed
such items as combustible gas detection, ventilation, de-ener-
gizing electrical ignition sources, posting of warning signs,
and notification to fire and guard forces.
Safety SiqnaIs
(1) Uniform audible and visible safety signals shall be used.
"(2) Signal meanings shall be posted in all operation areas. All
personnel must know and obey the signals.
System Identification
Thepreferred method of indicating the contents of a container or
system is the printed word. Color codes are strictly secondary.
if used, however, color codes should be uniform.
Amount of Hydroqen Leakaqe Permitted at Test Insta].lations
(i) Every reasonable effort should continuously be made to eliminate
leakage from hydrogen-using installations. In practice, however,
complete elimination of leakage is sometimes very difficult to
obtain. Therefore, operations may be done with some leakage
if the test i.nstallation is entirely out-of-doors or in a we41l-
ventilated expendable buildinq. The following shall be used as
a guide for determining the amount of leakage to be tolerated:
(2) Hydrogen leakage shall not exceed that causing an indication
of 20 percent of the lower explosive limit at a distance of 2
feet above the leakage source (no wind) and shall only be per-
mitted providing:
(a) The source of leakaqe is known and the Ieakaqe ,is .stab!_.
(For example, leakage from a crack may be unstable inasmuch
as the crack may increase in size.)
(b) Plentiful ventilation is provided.
(c) The leakage is unconfined and free to diffuse rapidl'_
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(d) Ignition sources are eliminated.
(e) Gas detection means are employed as stated above.
(f) Leakage is determined at test temperatures and pressures•
(g) Fu|ly informed and experienced judgment approves.
(3) In the foregoing, the leakage may be determined by using helium
in conjunction with a mass spectrometer and by converting the
reading to the equivalent quantity of hydrogen.
o. Hydroqen Gas Cylinders
(|) Do not transport cylinders unless valye is covered with protective
bonnet•
(2) Never handle cylinders roughly.
(3) Secure cylinders in an upright position with a chain, cable, or
strap.
(4) Store cylinders in places where they are not subjected to physical
damage and where they are protected from direct summer sunlight.
(5) Do not use leaky or damaged cylinders. Mark as defective and
inform disposal personnel.
(6) Never alter, repair, change, or take apart a valve or safety disc
on a cylinder•
(7) Use proper regulator on all cylinders. Tag regulator to indicate
its use.
(8) Do not use a wrench to open a cylinder valve. If it can't be opened
by hand, tag it as a bad valve and return it to the supplier.
(9) Cylinders used in laboratories should not be left unattended;
they should be removed to a safe storage area when not in use.
{]O) Never open the valve to "blow clear" before connecting a cylinder.
There is danger of igniting the hydrogen.
po Safety Approval Required Before Initial OpeFation
Before any test insta1|ation is operated with hydrogen, approval of
operational safety shall be obtained from the proper safety authority.
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q. Avoid "Last-Minute" Rushinq
In the eagerness to commence test operations, especially in new insta11-
ations, extreme care must be taken so that recklessness does not develop.
|t must be kept in mind that the starting of operations is a crltlcal
period. Unexpected and hazardous conditions may be discovered.
and qperational check procedures shall be carefu11y and completel Y
fol!.owed. Initial tests shall always be at conditions of lesser severity.
The conditions of greater severity ultimately desired shall be applied
only after the safety of operation at the conditions of lesser severity
has been proven; for example, test at low speed before high speed, low
pressure before hiQh pressure, liquid nitrogen before Iiquld hydrogen.
If possible, transitions between conditions should be gradual,
8. EMERGENCY PROC.EDI/RE_
al EmerqencyShutdown Switch
gn setups equipped with an emergency shutdown system, whether auto-
matic or manual, there shall always be a manual switch. In the
event of uncontrolled leak, fire, over-speed, or other emergency,
the operator shall notify the appropriate fire and da_nage-control
forces immediately.
b.
0
presence of Combustible Gas Mixture
When an accumulation of combustible gas is known to be present in a
test cell or area:
(1) DO D °t .actuate electrical or other deyices havinq questionable
non-sparkinqcharacteristicE. Telephoqes and radios usually fa]i
in this category. Metal dampers, sash, doors, etc. may create
sparks when opened.
(2) Shut off the gas and ventilate
(3) Evacuate the area. Personnel shall stay out of areas where there
are combustible gases. .
(4) Notify fire and guard forces immediately.
c. Use of Portable Hydroqen Detector s
(l) Portable detectors are used to determine whether dangerous _unts
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of hydrogen have been released in areas not equipped with installed
detectors, or to check areas where an accident has left the in-
stalled detectors inoperable.
Only units approved for hydrogen are to be used. This approval means
that the detector will not act as an ignition source. However, it
does not ellminate other sources of danger.
(3) One danger results from the fact that detectors may give falsely
low readings in the presence of high concentrations of hydrogen.
Therefore, a sudden shift of wind or a rapid additional release
of hydrogen might surround a man with a highly flammable mixture,
even though the detector indicates less than 100% of the L.E.L.
(Lower Exploslve Limit).
Another source of danger is that the detector may respond to the
presence of various inert gases, such as helium or carbon dioxide.
These will affect the readings because the instruments are cali-
brated with hydrogen-air mixtures. In some cases, negative read-
ings result, which makes it impossible to detect small hydrogen
concentrations.
(s) For these reasons, portable detectors must be used with great care.
Always approach the suspected area slowly, proceeding in a direction
with the wind. Leave the area immediately if the detector indicates
lO%of the L.E.L., or if it begins to show negative readings.
Watch the meter constantly; the instruments do not respond instantly
to changes in hydrogen concentration, so any sign of "changing"
readings is a signal to stop until the needle is steady.
(l) Typical Fire Involvinq Liquid Hydroqen
A typical fire-fiahting problem will be described. Refer to
paragraphs 2 a, 2 b, and 2 c for further discussion of the burn-
ing behavior of hydrogen.
Assume rupture of a large liquid hydrogen container or supply
piping system, such that a large amount of hydrogen is re-
|eased In an unconfined area. Considerable liquid will immed-
Iately flash to vapor and mix rapidly with air. _hen ignited,
thls large volume of mixture will burn very quickly. The
effects accompanying this initial phase are described below
under paragraph (2); once ignition occurs, nothing can be done
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to counteract these effects. In the final phase of the
fire,hydrogen will continue to burn at a rate governed by
its vaporization rate, and there may be time to take action
as described below under paragraph (3). Note, however, that
in the case of multiple-wall vessels the insulating vacuum
could be lost at any time. This would instantly aggravate
the hazard by increasing the fuel flow to the fire.
(2) Initial Phase
(a). Flame effects. Flame will occupy the volume around the
ruptured tank. Spills of a few hundred gallons may cause
a "flash hot-gas bat1" about 50 feet in radius. Wind may
change the shape to an ellipsoid almost entirely downwind
of the rupture. Flame temperature will be approximately
360OOF.
(b) Radiation effects The hot.gas ball will radiate but at less
than the rate for a gasoline-air fire of the same size. Radi-
ation effects on adjacent vessels and lines should not be
severe, especially as reflective paint is normally used.
(3)
(c) Blast effects. Detonation of hydrogen-air mixtures in
unconfined spaces is unlikely. However, the rapid burning
of the initial cloud will produce pressure waves which are
sometimes strong enough to damage structures and injure people.
Final Phase
(a)
(b)
Hydrogen fires are invisible; and since they radiate less than
ordinary fires, and their radiation is strongly absorbed by nor-
mally-humid air, they usually give little warning of their pres-
ence either by sight or by feeling of warmth. Furthermore, the
invisible flame may be many feet long and it shifts quickly with
the slightest breeze. Therefore, personnel shall wear protective
clothinq when.fiqhtinq fires involvinq hydroqen.
The only positive way of handlinq a hydroqen fire is to let
it burn under control until the flow of hydroqen c_n be stopped.
If the hydrogen fire is extinguished and the flow of hydrogen
Is not stopped, a hazardous combustible mixture starts form-
ing at once. Very probably the mixture will be Ignited with
an explosion to cause more damage and restart the fire.
(c) The block or isolation valves located close to the hydrogen
7O
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(d)
(e)
(f)
container shall be closed by remote operation from a safe
distance outside of the local hazard area.
Although the hydrogen fire should not be extinguished until
the flow of hydrogen can be stopped, water sprays, etc. should
be used to extinguish any secondary fire and to prevent the
spread of the flre. The hydrogen containing equipment should
be kept cool by water sprays to decrease the rate of hydrogen
leak and prevent further heat damage. (However, do not apply
water directly to a cold wall that contains liquid hydrogen;
the water will act as a heat source and will aggravate leakage.)
It is permissible to use carbon dioxide CC02) in the presence
of hydrogen fires. Although there may be some toxic carbon
monoxide produced in the flame, it will not be a large amount.
Anyone breathing the hot flame gases wit1 die in any case, re-
gardless of the presence of carbon monoxide. By the time the
flame gases are diluted with fresh air to breathable tempera-
tures, the carbon monoxide will be down to tolerable levels.
However, confined spaces should be well ventilated before they
are entered. Dry chemicals are better than CO 2 because they
make the flames visible.
Personnel should operate remotely controlled water-spray
equipment if installed instead of hoses to cool equipment
and to reduce the spread of the fire. If necessary to use
hoses, those using the hoses should stay behind protective
structures. Fire fighting or other emergency personnel shall
confer and cooperate with personnel who are familiar with con-
ditions in the area of the emergency. Any unusual conditions
or materials shall be made known. Unexpected conditions may
require special actions.
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V-BAND COUPLINGS FOR LIQUID HYDROGEN LINES
1. V-band couplings, when prGperly applied, are approved for connecting
vacuum jacketzd liquid hydrogen lines. Suppllers offer a wide selection of
couplings which range from light to heavy-duty and cover a number of flange
angles and thicknesses. Visual inspection is often not adequate to distinguish
between some of the similar types. It is therefore mandatory to use part
numbers to insure proper application of the couplings. Table I lists
some couplings suitable for use on two, six and eight inch lines.
2. Prior to applying applicable V-band couplings, it is important that
ma_e and female flanges mate properly. It is not expected that these couplings
will correct any misalignment inherent due to fabrication, nor will they make
a leak-free joint where flanges and/or O-rings have been damaged,
3. In applying and tightening the couplings, extreme care must be exercised
to insure a leak-free joint.
4. Vacuum jacketed piping should not be subjected to excessive tension
forces. For example: Extremely high tension forces can result from contraction
of the piping due to cool-down and these must be avoided by proper design and
installation. Flexible sections are often employed; however, to be effective,
these sections must be connected with sufficient slack (or ccrnpresslon) when
wa.-m so thaL they will not be excessively stretched as the system is cooled to
the operating temperature.
5. When trailer dewars are connected to the various test fac|lities,
excessive tension loads can easily occur in the flexible transfer lines.
The following procedure is set forth as an example of how the problem can
be avoided: After completion of the hook-up and prior to operation, the
dewar should be moved to compress the flexible hose an amount equivalent to
the amount of contract3on induced in the line when the system is brought to
the operating temperature, if compression cannot be obtained, the flex
hose should be permitted to loop sufficiently so that the line will straighten
out on contraction. This operation will eliminate axial tension to which
the coupling would otherwise be subjected when the line contracts. Stainless
steel will contract at the rate of 0.0417"/ft from +70 ° to -425°Fo
EXAMPLE: If the line between the dewar and the anchor point in the
system is 30 feet long, the dewar movement required to
either compress or loop the flex hose, should be 30 x .0417
or approximately 1¼ inches.
6. Care must be exercised in the handling of flanges and 0-rings.
When not in'use, cover plates must be attached toprotect both the male and
female flanges and 0-rings and to prevent contamination of the system.
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APPENDIX ! (contd)
...J. , ........... ............
e
TABLE I
V-BAND COHPLI N_G..i N_RHAT 10N
..... REC_EHDEb .......................................
V- BAH0 COUPLiI_G
Special ity Products
Crop #4706-h- 550
or
Ha rfl_an .#/_d_75- 550-H
Haman #4170-I 2OO-H
Haman #4170- IhOO-H
(2) Latches - One
quick coupler and
One T-bol t
LATCHES $iEZ_E_ ..................... ' .................H_FACTURER RECO_ENOED * -T:EHPORARy ............
HUHBER & TYPE (QUANTITY) OPERATING PRESSURE (PSIG) SUBSTITUTES
BASED ON 4:i SAFETY FACTOR (SEE NOTE)
2 150 Speciality Prod
Crop #3_6-8-550
S_e 4 165 Marman _175-
i 200-D
4 135 Marman #4175-
I_00-0
Same
NOTE: These V-band couplings do not have the features of the recommended type which provide more take-up
and permit more equal dlstributlon of band tension, it is recommended that these couplings be used
only until the recommended coupling is available.
iAPPEND IX 2
GASKET MATERIALS FOR CRYOGENIC SERVICE
I. The following materials have been laboratory and/or field tested
and are approved for cryogenic service:
a. Glass-filled Teflon materials conforming to Martin Company
Specification Control Drawing 55E 30. Approved materials and
sources are:
(I) Fluorogold - manufactured by Fluorocarbon Corporation,
1754 Clementine Street, Anaheim, California
(2) Cryo|-s and Cryoi-m - manufactured by Johns-Manville,
2060 Bronx Street, Bronx 60, New York.
(3) Fluorogreen E-600 - manufactured by John L. Dare Co.,
P.O. Box 7772, Houston 7, Texas.
(4) Garlock Chemiseal 8573 - manufactured by U.S. Gasket
Ccmpany, Plastics Division, Garlock, Inc., 610 N. lOth'Street,
Camden _, New Jersey.
(5) Fluororay Blue Ceramic - manufactured by Raybestos -
Manhattan, Inc., Bridgeport, Conn.
b. Teflon-encapsulated, metal-reinforced asbestos. Approved
material and source is CG-12 - manufactured by Fluorocarbon
Corporation.
o
c. Teflon-impregnated asbestos (Johns-Manvi|le JM-91) with
copper ferrules on inside and outside diameters, manufactured to
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General Dynamics/Astronautics Part Number GD/A 83-67907 by Gasket
Nanufacturing Company, 319 West 17th Street, Los Angeles, California,
or by Johns-Hanville.
2. Gasket dimensions and tolerances shall conform to Appendix 3.
Reference: Memo of 17 December 1962 by Lt. Col. Norris E. Hartweli
USAF_ Chief, Engineering Division, Facilities Design
Directorate, Ballistic Systems Division, Norton AFB, Calif.
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APPENDIX 3
I,L_,
Nominal
Pipe Size
OF
Tube O.D. ,
inches
i ii
1/2
3/4
STANDARDGASKET DIMENSIONS FOR BLS FLANGES
For Use With Welding Neck, Sllp-On, Blind, Lap Joint
or Socket Weld Flanges, Fiat or Raised Face
Gasket
Inside
Diameter
inch*
I
1 114
i ! 5/8
I i14
| i12
2
2 I/2
Gasket Outside Diameter ** for ASA Flanges as Noted
3 I/2
4
,5
6
8
0
12
14
16
18
2o
i,
24
150 Ib 300 Ib 4430 Ib 600 Ib 900 lb 500 Ib Z500 Ib
1 7/8 ,, 2 !/8 2 1/8 2 1/8 2 1/2 2 1/2 2 3/4
2 !/4 2 5/8 2 5/8 2 5/8 2 3/4 2 3/4 3
i.ii
2 5/8 2 7/8 2 7/8 2 7/8 3 1/8 3 1/8 3 3/8
2 3
i • . i
2 114 3 318
2 3/4 4 i/8
3 114 4 718
3 I/4 3 I14 3 I/4 3 I/2 3 I/2 4 I18
3 3/4 3 3/4 3 3}4 3 "7/8" 3 7/8 4 5/8
4 3/8 4 318 4 318 5 518 5 518 5 314
5 1/8 5 1/8 5 1/8 6 1/2 6 I/2 6 5/8
!i3 7/8 3/8 ' 5 7/8 5 7/8 5 7/8
j ,i i! i i i i,
4 3/8 6 3/8 6 1/2 6 3/8 6 3/8
4 7/8 6 7/8 7 1/8 7 7 5/8
7 314 8 112 8 3/8 9 I/26
7 I/8
9 l/8
8 3/4 9 7/8 9 314 i0 i/2
11 I/4
11 12 1/8 2
l] 3/8 14 I/4 14 I/8
16 I/8:16 5/8 16 I/2
I
17 314J 19 1/8 19
i
t
20 I/4 ! 21 I/4 21 I18
i i i i
6 518 6 718 7 3/_
8 1/8 8 114 9 !/4
9 3/4 I0 I1
It 3/8 ll 1/8 12 1/2
12 518 14 I18 13 718 15 I14
13 1/4
14 518
15 3/4 17 1/8 17 1/8 18 3/4
18 19 5/8 20 1/2 21 5/8
16 518
18 5/8
20 5/8
24 3/4
21 5/8 23 !/2
23 7/8 25 3/4
28 I/4 30 1/2
, , ,,,,
Plus 1/32" minus O, thru I0" size; plus I/
19 3/8
22 I/4
20 I/2
22 5/8
22 3/4
i, ill
25 I/4
23 3/8 24 I/8 25 1/8 27 3/4
25 I/2 26 7/8 27 i/2 29 3/4
t
30 1/4 31 118 33 35 112
6" minus O, from 12" thru 24"
*_ Plus or minus 1/32" thru I0" size; plus or minus 1/16" from 12" thru 2V'
For use also with 150 lb MSS, IPS corrosion weight, or light-type tube flanges
76
]le,oo .... :::-I l I i I t t al f ! _ _
_,_ .......... ,I600 _ Froude ntunber
600 Q volume _low_ ft3/aec . :
_g acceleration due to gravtt¥, ft/sec_=?==_ !
D stack diameter, t't
400 _ L _lame height, ft
i I I I ! I I I ! i |
I! - -
,v!eo III ..-,
40 _ ,
II
10
10 4 _ _ 6 _ 10 _ _ 4 6 _ I0;: 2' 4
I I [i ' : :!: ! I.......... ''
...... lJl|1|
! I I :: : I ! I
111
I 1 J 1. I:1
,,, 1ill !!
Ill III
tll , 'li
_;_ 2. _0) Bu Htnae
IIIII i
6 : ] 0 _ 2 4 6 8 lO 8 ;_
;_.'._.t.e_ _r. i lct.t|r=.=, Jute)
Appendtx 4. - [_¢lat_on between hy;Ipo_;en-burnof_" fla_.e .he!_;._,t _,.Jl _c_!_'_.e_l Frc_Je r,u_..uer _f
5 to 70 2b/_ec).
_lou (dat;= wcce determined _or wet_ht _low= _Pom
!
FLAHE HEIGHTS 0_/ H2 BURNOFFS
APPENDIX 5
According to theory, the ratio of flame height to stack diameter should
depend on Froude number raised to some powerS:
L/D is proportional to Fn
The F_oude number expresses the ratio of the initial momentum of the gas to
the buoyancy. A large Froude number means that the flame has the appearance of
a directed jet; that is, it is long and does not spread very much. If the
Froude number is smaller, the flame is buoyant. It grows much wider than the
stack diameter and is readi]y tilted by the wind.
All this applies only if the flow is thoroughly turbulent as it leaves
the stack.
If the flame is buoyant, the mixing of fuel and air is assisted _nd the
flame height is reduced. There is a power-law relation between L/D and air
entrainment. The relation is such that the exponent on Froude number is 0.33
at low values of L/D. At higher values, the exponent drops to 0.20. Eventually,
at very large Froude numbers, the flame is controlled entlrely by momentum;
presumably, the exponent would then become zero and L/D would become constant.
Appendix 4 shows that data obtained with large weight flows of hydrogen
conform to theory, even though the theory is based on observations of labor-
atory flames involving very small weight flows. At the lower Froude numbers,
the slope of the line is 0.32 (theory: 0.33), and it drops to 0.18 at higher
Froude numbers (theory: 0.20).
Theory does not provide any way to guess the Froude-number range where
the exponent would drop to O. lO and then to zero. However, the data already
cover a very wide range of Froude numbers, and Appendix 4 should therefore be
helpful in predicting flame heights for most hydrogen burnoffs. The lower
line segment can be extrapolated to lower Froude numbers with confidence.
Extrapolation of the upper segment to higher Froude numbers will tend to over-
estimate the flame heights and so will yield conservative results.
In conclusion, attention is again drawn to the fact that buoyant flames
are easily blown about by the wind. A burnoff must be located far enough
from a facility so that an adverse wind will not carry the flame too close.
* P. H. Thomas: Ninth Combustion Symposium, pg. 844.
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i!_ _ *Liquid heliurrvhydrogen
_,_ .; _ fill and discharge
:_ Pressurizing ' _ tl
:_-i_,.__ connection __ "'| . '
_ _ _ Heliunvhydrogen
i _ I pres_uregacJe
_i ..--- Heliu rrvhydrogen
valve
/' _"-'-" Liquid nitrogen
Bellowsseal--.. 1
Nitrogen vent
°1
pressure relief
fill line
Static opening into
liquid helium/
hydrogen space
• . _, _"
::I: i
Nitrogen ",!H'"LIlIil I! ,clnnerhelium/
reservoir "-,...,., / I\ ,";"hydrogen assembly
Helium_rogen"L" ) l l'_tl 3 i\
reservoir-..j,'_.._.. , I1_fl_/\\__'_ X-_itr°_en
ssembly
*Standard opening _8" O. D. by O.020" wall
Larger neck opening available on special order
Appendix 6. - Dual entry laboratory Dewar. 79
